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ABSTRACT 
The s a l i e n t  r e s u l t s  of a s t u d y  t o  a p p l y  d i f f e r e n t i a l  game 
t h e o r y  t o  a e r i a l  combat  problems are p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  r e p o r t .  
A new a p p r o a c h  t o  manned aer ia l  combat  games has been developed 
t h a t  i n c l u d e s  t h e  s t a t i s t i c a l  e f fec ts  o f  human o b s e r v a t i o n .  T h i s  
method has been a p p l i e d  t o  two c l a s s i c a l  d i f f e r e n t i a l  game problems.  
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  a n  a p p r o a c h  t o  t h e  "dogf igh t "  p rob lem has been 
developed .  

FOREWORD 
T h i s  r e p o r t  was prepared by t h e  C o n t r o l  Systems Department of 
Bol t   Beranek   and  Newman I n c . ,  Cambridge, Massachuse t t s .  It repre- 
s e n t s  t h e  r e s u l t s  of a s t u d y  made f o r  t h e  Langley Research Cen te r  
unde r  N A S A  C o n t r a c t  NAS1-8296 tha t  r e s u l t e d  from a n  u n s o l i c i t e d  
p r o p o s a l .  The work was a d m i n i s t e r e d   u n d e r  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of  D r .  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Unt i l  r e c e n t l y ,  ae r ia l  combat problems had b e e n  o f  d e c r e a s i n g  
i n t e r e s t  t o  t he  research  community.  The e v o l v i n g   n a t u r e   o f  war- 
fare ,  i n c r e a s e s  i n  a i r c ra f t  speeds, and  advances i n  weapons s y s -  
tems a l l  seemed t o  mitigate a g a i n s t  manned aer ia l  "duels" .   Hence,  
a i rc raf t  per formance  charac te r i s t ics  were m o s t  o f t e n  b e i n g  deter- 
mined by o t h e r  m i s s i o n  r e q u i r e m e n t s  a n d  t h e  p i l o t ' s  r o l e  i n  a n y  
a e r i a l  combat appeared t o  be o f   l e s s e n i n g   i m p o r t a n c e .   I n d e e d ,  
t h e  " d o g f i g h t " ,  where s l i g h t  a d v a n t a g e s  i n  a i r c r a f t  p e r f o r m a n c e  
a n d  p i l o t  s k i l l  would  de te rmine  t h e  outcome i n  a n  a e r i a l  b a t t l e ,  
seemed t o  be  a t h i n g  o f  t h e  past .  
Recent  developments  i n  S o u t h e a s t  Asia have shown t h a t  t h i s  
e v a l u a t i o n  o f  a i r - t o - a i r  c o m b a t  was a b i t  p remature  - t h e  days o f  
t h e  "Red Baron" are f a r  f rom  ove r  (Ref .1) .  Moreover ,   ques t ions  
are b e i n g  raised anew as t o  r e q u i s i t e  a i rc raf t  performance charac-  
t e r i s t i c s  a n d h a n d l i n g  q u a l i t i e s ,  a p p r o p r i a t e  p i l o t  t a c t i c s ,  p r o -  
c e d u r e s   f o r   p i l o t   t r a i n i n p ,   e t c .  As a r e s u l t ,   r e s e a r c h   i n t o  
aer ia l  combat  problems has b e e n  s t i m u l a t e d  g r e a t l y .  
I n  i t s  simplest  form,  a e r i a l  combat may b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a 
p r o b l e m   o f   p u r s u i t   a n d   e v a s i o n .  One a i r c r a f t ,  t h e  p u r s u e r ,  i s  
a t t e m p t i n g  t o  " c a p t u r e "  a n  o p p o s i n g  a i r c r a f t ,  t h e  e v a d e r ,  who 
wishes t o   a v o i d   s u c h   a n   o u t c o m e . '  (We u s e  t h e  word c a p t u r e  t o  
des igna te   an   ou tcome  t h a t  i s  a d v a n t a g e o u s   t o  t he  p u r s u e r .   F o r  
example,  c a p t u r e  may mean s i m p l y  that  t h e  e v a d e r  i s  w i t h i n  t a rge t  
o f  t h e  p u r s u e r ' s  g u n s . )  I n  a more  complex  vers ion  of  t h e  problem, 
t h e  r o l e s  o f  p u r s u e r  a n d  e v a d e r  may be  i n t e r c h a n g e d  s e v e r a l  times 
d u r i n g  the  c o u r s e  o f  a b a t t l e ;  such  a s i t u a t i o n  may be  c a l l e d ,  
I For  ease of d i s c u s s i o n ,  we sha l l  f r e q u e n t l y  r e f e r  t o  t h e  a i r c r a f t  
as though t h e y  were o p p o s i n g  i n d i v i d u a l s .  
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a p p r o p r i a t e l y ,  a " d o g f i g h t " .   I n  e i t h e r  c a s e ,  a e r i a l  combat, as 
t h e  name i m p l i e s ,  i s  a s i t u a t i o n  i n  which t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  h a v e  
c o n f l i c t i n g   o b j e c t i v e s .  The mathematical theory   which  i s  con- 
ce rned  w i t h  d e t e r m i n i n g  o p t i m a l  c o u r s e s  o f  a c t i o n  f o r  o p p o n e n t s  
w i t h  c o n f l i c t i n g   o b j e c t i v e s  i s  t h e  Theory  of  Games ( R e f . 2 ) .  T h a t  
p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  theory  which  deals w i t h  s i t u a t i o n s  o f  a dynamic 
n a t u r e ,  i n v o l v i n g  l e n g t h y  s e q u e n c e s  o f  l o g i c a l l y  c o n n e c t e d  d e c i -  
s i o n s ,  i s  c a l l e d   D i f f e r e n t i a l  Game Theory   (Ref .3) .  I t  i s  t h i s  
a s p e c t  o f  game t h e o r y  t h a t  i s  m o s t  p e r t i n e n t  t o  t h e  s t u d y  of  a e r i a l  
combat. 
T h i s  r e p o r t  d e s c r i b e s  t he  r e s u l t s  o f  a r e s e a r c h  p r o g r a m t  t o  i n -  
v e s t i g a t e  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  game t h e o r y  t o  a e r i a l  com- 
bat problems.   S impl i f ied   combat   p roblems were t o  b e  a n a l y z e d   i n   a n  
a t t e m p t  t o  d e t e r m i n e  f u n d a m e n t a l  r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  t h e  outcome  of a 
combat   and   such   fac tors  as a i r c r a f t  p e r f o r m a n c e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  p i -  
l o t  t a c t i c s  a n d   i n f o r m a t i o n   a v a i l a b l e .   I n   a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  v a l u e   o f  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  game t h e o r y  f o r  s t u d y i n g  c c r r p l e x  a e r i a l  comtat  problems 
was t o  be assessed. Before  we d i s c u s s  what we h a v e   a c c o m p l i s h e d   i n  
c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t hese  o b j e c t i v e s ,  l e t  u s  d e s c r i b e  some o f  t h e  
s a l i e n t  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  problem. 
What i s  a D i f f e r e n t i a l  Game? T h i s  s imple q u e s t i o n  i s  n o t  
answered  s imply.  F o r  p re sen t   pu rposes ,   however ,  i t  i s  u s e f u l   t o  
d e s c r i b e  b r i e f l y  t h e  most b a s i c  t y p e  of   p roblem,  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  
z e r o - s u m ,   d e t e r m i n i s t i c   d i f f e r e n t i a l  game. A c r u d e   d e f i n i t i o n   o f  
such a Fame may b e  g i v e n  as f o l l o w s :  
tThe program was conducted by BBN f o r  t h e  Lanpley  Research  Center  
tiA more p r e c i s e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  problem can b e  found i n  Ref . 4 .  
t i  
unde r   Con t rac t  No. NAS 1-8296. 
2 
Determine the pa i r  (u* ,v*)  that  p r o v i d e s  a s a d d l e p o i n t  o f  
s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  
;r = f ( X , U , V , t )  ; x ( t o )  = x. 
U E U  , V E V  
and 
h ( x ( T ) , T )  = 0 (1.4) 
where, i n  t h e  p a r l a n c e  o f  game t h e o r y ,  J i s  t h e  p a y o f f ,  x i s  t h e  
( v e c t o r )  p o s i t i o n  o r  "s ta te"  o f  t h e  game, u and v are c a l l e d  
s t r a t eg ie s ,  and are  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  c e r t a i n  sets of admissable 
s t r a t e g i e s ,  U and V ,  which d e p e n d ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  on t h e  s p e c i f i c  
p r o b l e m  t o  b e  so lved ,  and  a s a d d l e p o i n t  i s  t h e  p a i r  o f  o p t i m a l  
s t r a t e g i e s  u*  and  v*  which s a t i s f y  
Equa t ions  ( 1 . 2 )  t h rough  ( 1 . 4 )  can  be  though t   o f  as d e f i n i n g  
t h e  r u l e s  of t h e  game. The p r o g r e s s   o f  p l a y  i s  governed b y  t h e  
n f i r s t - o r d e r  d i f f e r e n t i a l  e q u a t i o n s  ( 1 . 2 )  - hence ,  t he  name 
D i f f e r e n t i a l  Game. P l a y  starts a t  time to i n  t h e  s t a t e  x. and 
t e r m i n a t e s  a t  the first time t = T  such  that ( 1 . 4 )  i s  s a t i s f i ed ,  
i . e . ,  Eq. ( 1 . 4 )  p r o v i d e s  a s t o p p i n g  r u l e .  
3 
The payof f  J i s  a n u m e r i c a l  m e a s u r e  f o r  d e t e r m i n i n e  t h e  ou t -  
come o f  t h e  game a n d  f o r  e v a l u a t i n g  the  merits o f  p a r t i c u l a r  
s t ra tegies .  C o n f l i c t  i s  i n t r o d u c e d ,  mathematically, by h a v i n g  
one p l a y e r  choose h i s  s t ra tegy  t o  maximize t h e  p a y o f f ,  whi le  t h e  
o t h e r  p l a y e r  attempts t o  minimize t h e  same payof f  t h rough  h i s  
s e l e c t i o n  o f  a s t ra tegy .  The game i s  zero-sum  because there  i s  a 
s ingle  payoff  and  one  p l a y e r ' s  g a i n  i s  t h e  o t h e r  p l a y e r ' s  loss. 
The o p t i m a l  s t ra teg ies  u* and  v* are  c o m p l e t e  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  
f o r  p l a y  o f  t h e  game i n  terms o f  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n   a v h i l a b l e .  T h i s  
t y p e  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  game i s  assumed t o  b e  o n e  o f  p e r f e c t  i n f o r -  
ma t ion :   bo th  p l a y e r s  know  how t h e  game p roceeds  ( E q s .  (1.1) 
th rough  ( 1 . 4 ) )  and t h e  s t a t e  x ( t )  a t  time t .  As a r e s u l t ,  
s t ra teg ies  are  norma l ly  de f ined  by e x p r e s s i o n s  o f  t h e  form 
I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  s t r a t eg ie s  are  f eedback ,  or c l o s e d - l o o p ,  c o n t r o l  
laws. When t h e  p l aye r s  do   no t   have   per fec t   in format ion ,   one   can-  
n o t  o b t a i n  s o l u t i o n s  i n  terms of  s t r a t e g i e s  o f  t h e  form of  
E q .  ( 1 . 6 ) ,  a n d   a l t e r n a t e   p r o c e d u r e s  are d i c t a t e d .  We sha l l  s a y  
more  about t h i s  l a t e r .  
It  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  n o t e  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no   a s su rance  t h a t  t h e  
game, as fo rmula t ed   above ,  will e v e r   t e r m i n a t e .   I n d e e d ,   i n  some 
i n s t a n c e s ,  t h e  ve ry  e s sence  o f  t he  problem  can b e  t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  
t h e  game. For  example,  i f  E q .  ( 1 . 4 )  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  c o n d i t i o n   f o r  
c a p t u r e ,  o n e  may s i m p l y  b e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  whether  c a p t u r e  i s  poss-  
i b l e ,  i . e . ,  whether  t h e  game t e r m i n a t e s .   I s a a c s   ( R e f . 3 )   c a l l s  
4 
such  a problem a "game o f  k i n d " .  ( I n  C h a p t e r  5 w e  w i l l  see t h a t  
t h e  concep t  o f  a "game o f -  k i n d "  i s  u s e f u l  i n  s t u d y i n g  t h e  "dog- 
f i g h t "  problem.)  
To s t u d y  a e r i a l  combat i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  above game, one 
m u s t   s p e c i f y  t h e  p a y o f f  (l.l), t h e  e q u a t i o n s  of s ta te  (1.21, t h e  
c o n t r o l   c o n s t r a i n t s  (1.3), and the  t e r m i n a t i o n  c r i t e r i a  ( o r   c o n -  
s t r a i n t s ) ( l . 4 ) .   O r d i n a r i l y ,  t h e  e q u a t i o n s   o f  s ta te  w i l l  b e  some 
set  o f   e q u a t i o n s   d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  motion  of  t h e  v e h i c l e s .  Embodied 
i n  these e q u a t i o n s  a n d  i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  c o n s t r a i n t s  w i l l  b e  t h e  
per formance  c a p a b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  two a i r c r a f t .  The payoff   and  t h e  
t e r m i n a t l o n  c r i t e r i a  w i l l  g e n e r a l l y  r e f l e c t  t h e  g o a l s  o f  t h e  com- 
b a t a n t s ,  b u t  t h e y  might  a l s o  i n c l u d e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  are  i n d i c a t i v e  
of s y s t e m   c o n s t r a i n t s   ( e . g . ,   w e a p o n s  systems l i m i t a t i o n s ) .  The 
a s sumpt ions  t ha t  are  made w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t hese  v a r i o u s  a s p e c t s  
of  t h e  problem w i l l  depend on t h e  k i n d  o f  r e s u l t s  b e i n g  s o u g h t .  
It  i s  n a t u r a l  t o  e x p e c t ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  t h e  more r e a l i s t i c  t h e  
a s s u m p t i o n s ,  t h e  harder i t  w i l l  b e  t o  s o l v e  t h e  p r o b l e m  a n a l y t i c -  
a l l y .  T h i s  i s  i n d e e d   t r u e   a n d   a n y t h i n g   s h o r t   o f   l i n e a r i z i n g  t h e  
e q u a t i o n s  o f  s t a t e  and  makinp  spec ia l  assumpt ions  about  t h e  payof f  
and t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  leads t o  p r o b l e m s  t h a t  are  i n t r a c t a b l e  a n a l y -  
t i c a l l y .  O f  c o u r s e ,  i f  one a t tempts  t o   f u r t h e r   c o m p l i c a t e  t h e  
problem, s a y  by i n c l u d i n g  s t o c h a s t i c  e f f e c t s ,  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
are compounded. 
There are two  obvious  approaches tha t  m i g h t  be employed i n  
a t t e m p t i n g   t o   o v e r c o m e  these d i f f i c u l t i e s .   F i r s t ,   o n e   c a n  a t -  
t empt  t o  f o r m u l a t e  m e a n i n g f u l  s i m p l i f i e d  problems t h a t  c a n  be  
s o l v e d  b y  a n a l y t i c ,  g e o m e t r i c  o r  s p e c i a l i z e d  c o m p u t a t i o n a l  p r o -  
c e d u r e s .  The s o l u t i o n s   t o   s u c h   p r o b l e m s   c o u l d  b e  mos t   u se fu l  
f o r  o b t a i n i n g  g e n e r a l  i n s i g h t s  i n t o  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  a e r i a l  combat,  
p r o v i d e d  tha t  o n e  a p p r e c i a t e s  t h e  e f f e c t s  tha t  t h e  r e q u i s i t e  
s impl i fy ing   a s sumpt ions   have   on  t h e  r e s u l t s .   S e c o n d ,   o n e  
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can  attempt t o  d e v e l o p  g e n e r a l  c o m p u t a t i o n a l  m e t h o d s  f o r  a i r -  
combat "games" s o  t h a t  b o t h  s i m p l i f i e d  a n d  r e a l i s t i c  p r o b l e m s  
can  be s o l v e d  d i r e c t l y .  
To some e x t e n t ,  w e  h a v e  p u r s u e d  b o t h  a p p r o a c h e s  i n  t h i s  pro-  
gram. We began by a n a l y z i n g  s i m p l i f i e d  problems w i t h  t he  aims o f  
e x p l o r i n g  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  these problems and  of  
d e v e l o p i n g  the  t e c h n i q u e s  a n d  i n s i p h t s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  s o l v e  more 
r e a l i s t i c   p r o b l e m s .  These i n v e s t i g a t i o n s   i n c l u d e d  a p r e l i m i n a r y  
s t u d y  o f  t h e  dogf igh t  p rob lem t h a t  r e v e a l e d  some of t he  e s s e n t i a l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s   o f  t h i s  e x c e e d i n g l y   d i f f i c u l t   p r o b l e m .  We a l s o  
s t u d i e d  t h e  Homocida l   Chauffeur   p roblem  in  some d e p t h ,  examining  
t h e  e f f e c t s  o f :  ( i) changing t h e  c a p t u r e   r e g i o n   t o  a fan-shaped 
" f i r i n g  e n v e l o p e " ;  ( ii) u s i n g  a p e n a l t y  f u n c t i o n  i n  p l a c e  o f  t e r -  
m i n a l   c o n s t r a i n t s ;  ( iii) c o n s t r a i n i n g  t h e  e v a d e r ' s   c o n t r o l ;   a n d ,  
( i v )  d e g r a d i n g  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  p l aye r s  ( i . e . ,  
i m p e r f e c t  i n f o r m a t i o n ) .  These  l a t t e r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s ,   t h o u g h   i n -  
t e r e s t i n p  a n d  i n f o r m a t i v e ,  t u r n e d  o u t  t o  b e  a n c i l l a r y  t o  t h e  re-  
s e a r c h  e f f o r t  a n d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e y  w i l l  n o t  b e  d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h i s  
r e p o r t .  As a r e s u l t   o f   o u r   a n a l y s e s ,  we h a v e   o b t a i n e d  a b e t t e r  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  g a n e  s o l u t i o n s ,  a n d  
of v a r i o u s  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  a l r - comba t  p rob lem,  a l though  we cannot  
asser t  t h a t  we have  found t h e  f u n d a m e n t a l  r e l a t i o n s  t ha t  we o r i g i -  
n a l l y   s o u g h t .  
The a n a l y t i c a l  i n v e s t i p a t i o n s  d e m o n s t r a t e d  t h e  need  f o r  a 
g e n e r a l   c o m p u t a t i o n a l   a p p r o a c h   t o   a i r - c o m b a t  games. They showed 
tha t  i t  i s  e v e n  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s o l v e  p r o b l e m s  t h a t  a p p e a r  t o  b e  
compara t ive ly  simple. Consequent ly ,  t h e  ma jo r   po r t ion   o f   ou r  
work was d e v o t e d  t o  t h e  s e a r c h  f o r  a su i t ab le  computa t ion  scheme .  
Our s t u d i e s  h a v e  l e d  u s  t o  a new c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  a i r -  
combat  problem  and a c o n c o m i t a n t   c o m p u t a t i o n a l   t e c h n i q u e .  The 
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approach  w i l l  b e  descr ibed i n  d e t a i l  l a t e r  i n  t h i s  r e p o r t .  I n  
e s s e n c e ,  i t  i n v o l v e s  t a k i n g  a c c o u n t  o f  p i l o t  l i m i t a t i o n s  d i r e c t l y  
and i n  s u c h  a way tha t  t h e  aer ia l -combat  problem can  b e  reduced  
t o  a Markov game. Although t h e  method has n o t  b e e n  f u l l y  tes ted,  
i t  appeays that  i t  has many advantages  and t h a t  i t  has g r e a t  
p o t e n t i a l  f o r  s o l v i n g  r e a l i s t i c  aer ia l -combat   p roblems.  We b e l i e v e  
tha t  t h e  d i scove ry  and  p re l imina ry  deve lopmen t  of t h i s  approach 
i s  t h e  most s i g n i f i c a n t  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  r e s e a r c h  p e r f o r m e d  i n  t h i s  
program. 
I n  t h e  remaizder of  t h i s  r e p o r t  we s h a l l  d i s c u s s  i n  d e t a i l  
t h e  r e s u l t s   o f   o u r   i n v e s t i g a t i o n s .  T h i s  c h a p t e r  and t h e  next   one 
are devo ted  p r i m a r i l y  t o  background  material and t o  a n  e f f o r t  t o  
p l a c e  o u r  work i n  p r o p e r  p e r s p e c t i v e  w i t h  o t h e r  r e s e a r c h  on d i f -  
f e r e n t i a l  game theory   and  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  a i r - c o m b a t  p r o b l e m s .  
I n  Chap te r  3 ,  t h e  above-ment ioned   computa t iona l   approach   to  a i r -  
combat "games" i s  d e s c r i b e d   i n  d e t a i l .  R e s u l t s  o b t a i n e d   i n  a p p l y -  
i n g  t h e  t e c h n i q u e  t o  t w o  exarcple problems a re  p iven  i n  t h e  n e x t  
chap te r .  Our a n a l y s i s  of t h e  d o p f i g h t   p r o b l e m   r e c e i v e s   s e p a r a t e  
a t t e n t i o n   i n   C h a p t e r  5 .  F i n a l l y ,   i n  C h a p t e r  6 ,  w e  p r e s e n t  some 
c o n c l u d i n g  remarks and  s u p F e s t i o n s  for f u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h .  
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2. THE ROLE OF DIFFERENTIAL GAMES I N  AERIAL COMBAT STUDIES 
The  theory  of  d i f f e r e n t i a l  games has sometimes been heralded 
as t h e  "answer" t o  t h e  aer ia l  combat   p roblem  ( jus t  as opt imal   con-  
t r o l  t h e o r y  was t h e  s o l u t i o n  t o  t he  t r a j e c t o r y  o p t i m i z a t i o n  p r o b -  
lem). On t h e  o t h e r   h a n d ,   o p i n i o n s   h a v e   a l s o   b e e n   e x p r e s s e d  that  
t h e  t h e o r y  w i l l  n e v e r  be made p r a c t i c a l  e n o u g h  t o  h a v e  a s i p n i f i -  
c a n t  impact on  such  problems (Ref .5 ) .  I n  t h e  l o n g   r u n ,   o n e  may 
e x p e c t  t h e  t r u t h  t o  l i e  somewhere  between these e x t r e m e  p o i n t s  o f  
view.   But ,  what i s  t h e  c u r r e n t  r o l e  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  game t h e o r y  
i n  a e r i a l  combat  problems  and what can  b e  e x p e c t e d  i n  t he  n e a r  
f u t u r e ?  
I n  a n  a t t e n p t  t o  shed some l i p h t  on these q u e s t i o n s  a n d  t o  
p l a c e  i n  p e r s p e c t i v e  t h e  work t o  be d e s c r i b e d  i n  l a t e r  chapters ,  
we w i l l  now examine t h e  a c t u a l  s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  games. However, w e  w i l l  n o t  attempt t o  p r e s e n t  a n  
e x h a u s t i v e   r e v i e w   o f  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e .   I n s t e a d ,  w e  t r y  t o  d i s c u s s  
i s s u e s  t h a t ,  o n c e  c l a r i f i e d ,  make i t  eas ie r  t o  assess t h e  d i f f i -  
c u l t i e s   a n d   p o t e n t i a l i t i e s   o f   d i f f e r e n t i a l  Fame t h e o r y .  We a l s o  
examine t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  game t h e o r y  t o  a e r i a l  
combat  problems  from t h e  s t a n d p o i n t  o f  what  has been  done ,  what 
p e o p l e  are doinp ,   and  what p r o s p e c t s  a re  f o r  t h e  f u t u r e .  
S t a t e  o f  t h e  Theory 
T h e  h i s t o r i c a l  o r i g i n  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  games (Ref .3 )   and  i t s  
concurren t  deve lopment  w i t h  o p t i m a l  c o n t r o l  t h e o r y  are  well-known 
( R e f . 6 ) .  When t h e  connec t ion   be tween t h e  two was r e a l i z e d  be- 
l a t e d l y ,  a n d  p o p u l a r i z e d  i n  t h e  ear ly-  a n d  m i d - s i x t i e s  , a f l u r r y  
o f  a c t i v i t y  f o l l o w e d  a n d  attempts were made t o  u n i f y  t h e  two d i s -  
c ip l ines .   Inasmuch  as most  of t h e  a c t i v e   w o r k e r s  came from t h e  
9 
o p t i m a l  c o n t r o l  f i e l d ,  a n a t u r a l  t e n d e n c y  was t o  v i e w  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
games as a n   e x t e n s i o n   o f   o p t i m a l   c o n t r o l   t h e o r y .  While some suc-  
c e s s  i s  a c h i e v e d  w i t h  t h i s  v i e w p o i n t   ( R e f . 7 ) ,  it g r a d u a l l y  became 
e v i d e n t  t h a t  such   an   approach  i s  n o t   e n t i r e l y   s a t i s f a c t o r y .  D i f -  
f e r e n t i a l  game t h e o r y  i s  s o  f u l l  o f  p i t f a l l s ,  a n a l y t i c a l  a n d  con- 
c e p t u a l ,  t h a t  experts  as we l l  as t h e  u n s u s p e c t i n g  f a l l  v i c t i m  t o  
t h e n .  
Given t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  d i f f e r e n t i a l  pame prob- 
lems, and t h e  p o p u l a r  n o t i o n  t h a t  d i f f e r e n t i a l  pame t h e o r y  was 
m e r e l y  a n  e x t e n s i o n  o f  o p t i m a l  c o n t r o l  t h e o r y ,  i t  i s  n o t  s u r p r i s -  
i n g  t h a t  much of  t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  p a n e s  l i t e r a t u r e  i s  d e v o t e d  t o  
t w o - p l a y e r ,   z e r o - s u m ,   d e t e r m i n i s t i c   p r o b l e m s .  Whi le  t hese  problems 
are o f  u n d e n i a b l e  i m p o r t a n c e ,  p r e o c c u p a t i o n  w i t h  them leads t o  a n  
unnecessa r i ly   na r row  po in t   o f   v i ew.  The r o l e  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  games 
i n  a i r  combat  problems i s  more r e a d i l y  assessed i f  we f i r s t  expand 
o u r   o u t l o o k .  T h i s  can b e  done b y  c o n s i d e r i n g   d i f f e r e n t i a l  games 
( a n d ,  h e n c e ,  o p t i m a l  c o n t r o l  p r o b l e m s )  as a s p e c i a l  c a s e  o f  a 
l a rge r  c l a s s   o f   d y n a m i c   o p t i m i z a t i o n   p r o b l e m s .  The f ramework   for  
t h i s  l a r g e r  c l a s s  o f  p r o b l e m s  may b e  c a l l e d  GeneraZized C o n t r o l  
T h e o r y .  
D i f f e r e n t i a l  Games and  General ized  Control   Theory--Our  pr ime 
concern  here  i s  w i t h  t h r e e  a spec tL  o f  dynamic  op t imiza t ion  p rob-  
lems: t h e  per formance   measures ,  t h e  number   o f   con t ro l l e r s ,   and  
t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n   a v a i l a b l e   t o   t h e s e   c o n t r o l l e r s .  I n  t r a d i t i o n a l  
o p t i m a l  c o n t r o l  p r o b l e m ,  t h e r e  i s  a s i n g l e  p e r f o r m a n c e  measure 
and a s i n g l e  c o n t r o l l e r  who i s  s u p p o s e d  t o  c o o r d i n a t e  a l l  c o n t r o l  
a c t i o n s .  T h i s  c o n t r o l l e r  has a c c e s s   t o  a l l  t h e  a v a i l a b l e   i n f o r -  
m a t i o n ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  s p e c i f i c  f o r m  a n d  t y p e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  may 
va ry   f rom  p rob lem  to   p rob lem.   In  t h e  z e r o - s u m ,   d e t e r m i n i s t i c  
game d e f i n e d  i n  Chap te r  1, t h e r e  are t w o  c o n t r o l l e r s  b o t h  of whom 
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h a v e   a c c e s s   t o  t h e  same " p e r f e c t "   i n f o r m a t i o n  s e t .  Each  con- 
t r o l l e r  has h i s  own pe r fo rmance  measu re ,  bu t ,  s ince  one  i s  t h e  
n e g a t i v e  o f  t h e  o t h e r  ( t h e  ze ro - sum p rope r ty ) ,  a s i n g l e  c r i t e r i o n  
may be u s e d  i n  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n   o f  t h e  game. Thus,  w i t h  r e s p e c t  
t o  t h e  three a s p e c t s  o f  a n  o p t i m i z a t i o n  p r o b l e m  b e i n g  c o n s i d e r e d  
here,  t h i s  t y p e  o f  game d i f fe rs  o n l y  s l i g h t l y  f r o m  t h e  o p t i m a l  
con t ro l   p rob lem.   (However ,   i n  terms o f   s o l v i n g   p r o b l e m s ,  t he  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  s l i g h t  d i f f e r e n c e  are s u b s t a n t i a l . )  
Many impor t an t  p rob lems  can  be  f o r m u l a t e d  e i t h e r  as o p t i m a l  
c o n t r o l   p r o b l e m s  or as two-p laye r ,   z e ro - sum,   de t e rmin i s t i c  d i f -  
f e r e n t i a l  games. On t h e  o t h e r   h a n d ,  i t  i s  easy t o  v i s u a l i z e  re-  
a l i s t i c  s i t u a t i o n s  or problems t h a t  canno t  b e  t r ea t ed  a d e q u a t e l y  
w i t h i n  e i t h e r  of these  frameworks.   Indeed,  i t  i s  n o t   d i f f i c u l t  
t o  t h i n k  o f  p r o b l e m s  i n  w h i c h  t h e r e  i s  a m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  c o n t r o l -  
l e r s  ( o p e r a t i n g  w i t h  or w i t h o u t  c o o p e r a t i o n  f r o m  o t h e r s ) ,  e a c h  
h a v i n g  a d i f f e r e n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  s e t  and a d i f f e r e n t  p a y o f f  (per -  
formance   measure) .  We c a l l   s u c h  a m u l t i - c o n t r o l l e r ,   m u l t i -  
i n f o r m a t i o n - s e t ,  m u l t i - p a y o f f  s i t u a t i o n  a g e n e r a Z i z e d  controZ 
prob Zem. 
The n o t i o n  o f  g e n e r a l i z e d  c o n t r o l  p r o b l e m s  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  new. 
A s  a s t a r t  toward t h e  development   of  a t h e o r y  f o r  s u c h  p r o b l e m s ,  
i t  i s  u s e f u l  t o  c l a s s i f y  s p e c i f i c  p r o b l e m s  w i t h i n  the  g e n e r a l i z e d  
framework. One way o f   do inp  t h i s  i s  t o   d i v i d e   i n t o   s u b c a t e g o r i e s  
each  of  t h e  a s p e c t s  o f  a n  o p t i m i z a t i o n  p r o b l e m  tha t  w e  have been 
d i s c u s s i n g .  For t h e  c r i t e r i o n  J, we have:  ( i )  one J ,  (ii) two J's 
w i t h  J1=-J and (iii) m u l t i p l e  J's w i t h  CJi#O. For the  c o n t r o l l e r  
C ,  w e  have :  ( i )  one C ,  ( ii) two C's, and t i i i )  m u l t i p l e  C's. 
F i n a l l y ,  f o r  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  s e t  I ,  we have t h e  c a s e s :  ( i )  one 
pe r fec t  i n f o r m a t i o n  s e t ,  ( ii) one   no isy  (or i m p e r f e c t )   i n f o r m a t i o n  
s e t ,  and (iii) m u l t i p l e   i n f o r m a t i o n  sets .  
t 
2 '  
I 
+Zero-sum games w i t h  more than  two  p layers  may a l s o  b e  d e f i n e d ,  
b u t  t h e y  are of m i n o r  i n t e r e s t .  
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Using t h e  a b o v e  c a t e g o r i e s ,  o n e  can o r g a n i z e  v a r i o u s  p r o b l e m  
areas i n  t h e  manner  shown i n  Tab le  1. From t h i s  table  we can  see 
why the  g e n e r a l i z e d  c o n t r o l  t h e o r y  v i e w p o i n t  i s  impor tan t   concep-  
t u a l l y . '   F o r   i n s t a n c e ,  i t  shows c l e a r l y  tha t  p r o b l e m s   o f   c o n f l i c t  
are  j u s t  a spec ia l  c l a s s  o f  t he  g e n e r a l  o p t i m i z a t i o n  p r o b l e m .  
F u r t h e r m o r e ,   t w o - p l a y e r ,   z e r o - s u m ,   d e t e r m i n i s t i c   d i f f e r e n t i a l  
games are ,  i n  t u r n ,  o n l y  a p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e  o f  t h e  problem of con- 
f l i c t .  Thus , i f  t h e  theo ry   o f   such  games i s  what  one  means by 
d i f f e r e n t i a l  game t h e o r y  (as  much o f  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  would i n d i c a t e ) ,  
i t  i s  i n d e e d  b o l d  t o  c l a i m  t h a t  t h i s  t h e o r y  will u l t i m a t e l y  p r o -  
v i d e  t h e  s o l u t i o n  t o  a l l  a e r i a l  c o m b a t   p r o b l e m s .   A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  
t o  assert  t h a t  d i f f e r e n t i a l  game t h e o r y  w i l l  b e  o f  n o  u t i l i t y  f o r  
ae r ia l  combat   s tudies ,   one  must   not   only b e  convinced of t h e  
f u t i l i t y  o f  t h e  zero-sum  approach,  h e  must a l s o  be i g n o r a n t  o f  
t h e  much r i c h e r  p r o b l e m  area i m p l i e d  b y  g e n e r a l i z e d  c o n t r o l  t h e o r y .  
Given tha t  g e n e r a l i z e d  c o n t r o l  t h e o r y  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n c e p -  
t u a l l y  a n d  t h a t  s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h e  more genera l  p roblems posed  by 
i t  would b e  e x t r e m e l y  u s e f u l ,  i t  i s  n a t u r a l  t o  ask:"What problems 
are  raised by  a d o p t i n g  t h i s  b r o a d e r  o u t l o o k ? "  I t  seems t o   u s  t h a t  
t h e  mos t  impor t an t  and  nos t  r e l evan t  p rob lems  are  t h o s e  a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  per formance  measures a n d   i n f o r m a t i o n   s t r u c t u r e s .  We now d i s -  
c u s s  b r i e f l y  some of  t h e s e  problems.  
While i t  has long   been   recopnized  t h a t  a s i n g l e  ( s c a l a r )  
c r i t e r i o n  i s  o f t e n  n o t  a n  a d e q u a t e  m e a s u r e  o f  s y s t e m  per formance ,  
i t  has n o t  been  p e n e r a l l y  r e c o p n i z e d  t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  con- 
s ider  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y   s e v e r a l   c r i t e . r i o n   f u n c t i o n s .  The c h i e f  
p r i c e  o n e  p a y s  f o r  s u c h  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  i s  t h a t  i t  I s  n o t  c l e a r  what 
one  means by a " s o l u t i o n "  t o  a v e c t o r - v a l u e d  o p t i m i z a t i o n  p r o b l e m .  
-~ 
'The t ab le  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  names f o r  t h e  v a r i o u s  p r o b l e m  c a t e -  
g o r i e s  may be i n a d e q u a t e .  For example, a more d e f i n i t i v e  t i t l e  
f o r  ( 3 )  i s  I r a  2C /2J /P I  problem i n  g e n e r a l i z e d  c o n t r o l  t h e o r y . "  
However, t h e  names are f i r m l y  en t renched   and   one   can  h a r d l y  ex- 
p e c t  s u c h  a new t e r m i n o l o g y  t o  take h o l d  a t  t h i s  s tage .  
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TABLE 1 
Classification of Optimization  Problems 
Con-  ation 
troller terion 
a, 
~ I 2  
(i=j-Deterministic Optimal 
" Control J 
(2ntochastic Optimal 
. . Control "". J 
( 3 )  Zero-Sum  Differential 
( 4 )  Stochastic  Zero-Sum 
( 5 )  Vector  Value  optimization 
( - 6 )  Nonzero-Sum  Differential 
( 7 )  Team  Theory 
Gam? " 
Differential  Game 




_" _ ~ _  
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Many new c o n c e p t s ,   s u c h  as t h e  “ p r i s o n e r ’ s  d i l e m n a ” ,  t h e  Nash 
e q u i l i b r i u m ,  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  s e t ,  and t h e  min imax  so lu t ion ,  
arise ( R e f . 8 ) .   H o w e v e r ,   t h i s   a m b i g u i t y  m e r e l y  f o r c e s   o n e   t o  
s h a r p e n  h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  o p t f m a l i t y ,  a c t u a l l y  l e a d i n g  t o  a 
b e t t e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g   o f  t h e  m u l t i - c r i t e r i o n   p r o b l e m .  We r e a l i z e ,  
f o r  example,  tha t  t h e  o f t e n  u s e d  d e v i c e  o f  o p t i m i z i n g  o n e  c r i -  
t e r i o n  t h a t  i s  a weighted  sum o f  t h e  many c r i t e r i a  that  r e q u i r e  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  i s  but  one  of  t h e  many w a y s  o f  r e s o l v i n g  t h e  problem 
(Ref s .9 , lO) .   Me thods   fo r   pe r fo rming  t h i s  k i n d   o f   r e d u c t i o n  a re  
d e s c r i b e d  i n  Refs. 11 and 1 2 .  
With r e s p e c t  t o  ae r i a l  combat, i t  i s  r e a s o n a b l y  c l e a r  t h a t  a 
s i n g l e  c r i t e r i o n  i s  n o t  a d e q u a t e  f o r  c e r t a i n  f i g h t e r  v s .  f i g h t e r  
d u e l   s i t u a t i o n s .   I n  a d o g f i p h t ,   f o r   e x a m p l e ,  t h e  combatants  may 
c h a n g e  r o l e s  f r o m  p u r s u e r  t o  e v a d e r  many times d u r i n g  t h e  c o u r s e  
of  an  engaKement  and t h e  g o a l s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  two r o l e s  a re  
o b v i o u s l y   d i f f e r e n t .   I n   a d d i t i o n ,   p i l o t   p r e f e r e n c e s  and  o v e r a l l  
t a c t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  e n t e r  t h e  p r o b l e m  i n  a n o n t r i v i a l  way .  
We s h a l l  have  more t o  s a y  abou t  some o f  t hese  matters i n  C h a p t e r 5  
where we d i s c u s s  t h e  dogf igh t  p rob lem.  
One of  t h e  more i n t e r e s t i n g  a s p e c t s  o f  g e n e r a l i z e d  c o n t r o l  
t h e o r y  i s  t h e  p r o b l e m   o f   i n f o r m a t i o n   s t r u c t u r e s .  As noted  e a r l i e r ,  
i n  t r a d i t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  p r o b l e m s  the  i n f o r n a t i o n  p a t t e r n  i s  always 
assumed t o  b e  c o m p l e t e  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  has a c c e s s  
t o  a l l  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  a v a i l a b l e ,  w h e t h e r  i t  be p e r f e c t  ( d e t e r m i n -  
i s t i c )  o r  i m p e r f e c t   ( s t o c h a s t i c ) .  T h i s  c h e r i s h e d   c o n c e p t  i s  a l s o  
c a r r i e d   o v e r   t o  t h e  z e r o - s u m   d i f f e r e n t i a l  Fame.  However,  even f o r  
these games we b e g i n  t o  cet a n  i n k l i n g  o f  t he  e f f e c t  o f  informa- 
t i o n  on t h e  outcome.   (Ref .13)  We f i n d  t h a t  open-loop  (no  informa- 
t i o n )  and c l o s e d - l o o p   ( p e r f e c t   i n f o r m a t i o n )  p l a y s  g i v e  r i s e  t o  
d i f f e r e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  for t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  s a d d l e p o i n t  s o l u t i o n s .  
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T h i s  has i m p o r t a n t  i m p l i c a t i o n s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  numer i ca l  
" s o l u t i o n s "  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  games. 
I n  more g e n e r a l  c a s e s ,  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  p a t t e r n s  
c a n  be  o v e r r i d i n g .  Team t h e o r y  (Refs.14,15) i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a 
s tudy  of  t h e  v a l u e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  o p t i m i z a t i o n  
p r o b l e m s .   S t r a t e g i c  missile defense   and   squadron   vs .   squadron  
a i r  d u e l s  are  b a s i c a l l y  team t h e o r e t i c  p r o b l e m s  ( e . p . ,  what i s  t h e  
v a l u e  o f  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h a t  l e t s  eve ry  f i g h t e r  o r  missile know 
t h e  i n t e n d e d  t a r g e t  o f  a l l  f i g h t e r s  or missiles on i t s  team? O r ,  
i n  o t h e r  words ,  how  much shou ld  we p a y  f o r  c o m p l e t e l y  c e n t r a l i z e d  
c o n t r o l ? ) .   I n   n o n z e r o - s u m   d i f f e r e n t i a l  games, i n f o r m a t i o n   p a t t e r n s  
can  have a p ro found ,   and   somet imes   su rp r i s ing ,   e f f ec t .   Fo r   example ,  
i t  c a n  b e  shown t h a t  i n  some c a s e s  o p e n - l o o p  c o n t r o l  c a n  a c t u a l l y  
o u t p e r f o r m   c l o s e d - l o o p   c o n t r o l   ( t o  t h e  b e n e f i t   o f   b o t h  _- p l a y e r s )  
( R e f . 1 6 ) .   F i n a l l y ,   i n  a l l  c a s e s  where t h e r e  i s  more than  one  con-  
t r o l l e r  a n d  more t h a n   o n e   i m p e r f e c t   i n f o r m a t i o n  s e t ,  t h e  funda- 
m e n t a l   p r o b l e m   o f   i n f o r m a t i o n   c l o s u r e  a r i s e s .  T h i s  i s  t h e  familiar 
problem of  ''I know t h a t  you know t h a t  I know tha t  you know.. . . . ' I .  
So f a r ,  t h i s  problem has o n l y  b e e n  r e s o l v e d  f o r  t h e  s p e c i a l  c l a s s  
o f  z e r o - s u m  s t o c h a s t i c  d i f f e r e n t i a l  games (Refs .16-18) ,and  open-  
l o o p   t e a m - t h e o r e t i c   p r o b l e m s   ( R e f . l 4 ) , i n v o l v i n p   l i n e a r  systems,  
q u a d r a t i c   c r i t e r i a ,   a n d   g a u s s i a n   n o i s e .   I n  t hese  c a s e s ,  t h e  o p t i -  
mal a c t i o n s  t u r n  o u t  t o  be  l i n e a r  f u n c t i o n s  o f  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  a v a i l -  
ab le  t o   e a c h  p l a y e r .  T h i s  i s  n o t   n e c e s s a r i l y   a n   e x p e c t e d   r e s u l t  
inasmuch as o n e  c a n  c i t e  a counter  example  of a two-s tage ,  c losed-  
loop team-theory problem for  which t h e  l i n e a r  c o n t r o l l e r  i s  non- 
opt imal  (Ref.19). 
t h a t  z e r o - s u m  d e t e r m i n i s t i c  d i f f e r e n t i a l  gamest a r e  a spec ia l  
Zero-Sum ~ " 3 D e t e r m i n i s t i c   D i f f e r e n t i a l  Games--We h a v e   j u s t   s e e n  
." 
'Hereafter, u n l e s s  n o t e d  o t h e r w i s e ,  w e  s h a l l  mean t h i s  t y p e  o f  
game when w e  speak of d i f f e r e n t i a l  games. 
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class o f  what we c a l l e d   g e n e r a l i z e d   c o n t r o l   p r o b l e m s .  As s u c h ,  
these games are n o t  s u b j e c t  t o  most  of t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  c o n c e r n -  
i n g  p e r f o r m a n c e  m e a s u r e s  a n d  i n f o r m a t i o n  s t r u c t u r e s  t h a t  were 
d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h e  p rev ious   s ec t ion .   However ,   even  if w e  r e s t r i c t  
o u r s e l v e s  t o  t h i s  c l a s s  o f  p r o b l e m s ,  o u r  t r o u b l e s  are far  from 
o v e r .  From a n  a n a l y t i c  s t a n d p o i n t ,  t h e  p r i m e   s o u r c e   o f   d i f f i c u l t y  
i s  tha t  g l o b a l  d i f f e r e n t i a l  game s o l u t i o n s  are f r e q u e n t l y  c h a r a c -  
t e r i z e d  by t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a v a r i e t y  o f  s i n g u l a r  s u r f a c e s  
( R e f s . 2 0 - 2 3 ) .   C o n s e q u e n t l y ,   t e c h n i q u e s   f o r   o b t a i n i n g   a n s w e r s  
t h a t  r e l y  on  "smoothness"  assumptions  must be  used  w i t h  great 
c a r e ;  s o l u t i o n s  c a n n o t  b e  p ropaga ted  r e a d i l y  a c r o s s  t h e  s i n g u l a r  
s u r f a c e s .  To make matters worse ,  there d o   n o t   a p p e a r   t o  b e  gen- 
e r a l l y  e f f e c t i v e  p r o c e d u r e s  f o r  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  o f  these s u r f a c e s .  
They seem t o  t a x  t h e  i n g e n u i t y  a n d  r e s o u r c e f u l n e s s  o f  t h e  best  o f  
researchers .   However ,   f rom a p r a c t i c a l   p o i n t   o f   v i e w ,  many o f  
t h e  s i n g u l a r   s u r f a c e s  a re  somewhat less  i m p o r t a n t .  To a large 
e x t e n t ,  t h e i r  ex i s t ence   depends   on  t h e  i n f i n i t e  d i v i s i b i l i t y  o f  
time a n d  s p a c e  a n d ,  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  these  q u a n t i t i e s  w i l l  o f t e n  b e  
d i s c r e t i z e d .   I s a a c s '  book ( R e f . 3 )   c o n t a i n s  t h e  most  complete 
d i s c u s s i o n   o f  these s i n g u l a r   s u r f a c e s .  They will n o t  b e  pursued  
f u r t h e r  he re .  
The  n u m e r i c a l  s o l u t i o n  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  pames i s  very d i f f i -  
c u l t .  However, i f  one wishes t o   d e t e r m i n e  t h e  opt imal   open-loop 
c o n t r o l  a g a i n s t  a n  o p p o n e n t  o p e r a t i n g  w i t h  known g u i d a n c e  l o g i c ,  
t h a t  may o r  may n o t  b e  o p t i m i z e d ,  t h e n  t h e  problem  can b e  s o l v e d  
f o r   r e a s o n a b l y   c o m p l e x   s i t u a t i o n s .  ' Although these  are 
u s e f u l  k i n d s  o f  r e s u l t s ,  i t  must b e  r e c o g n i z e d  t h a t  t h e y  do   no t  
r e p r e s e n t   t r u e   d i f f e r e n t i a l  pame s o l u t i o n s .  They a re  s i m p l y  
s o l u t i o n s  t o  a n  o p t i m a l  c o n t r o l  p r o b l e m  i n  w h i c h  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  
one  of t h e  p l a y e r s  has been   prede termined .   Genera l   numer ica l  
t e c h n i q u e s  f o r  o b t a i n i n p  t r u e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  game s o l u t i o n  d o  n o t  
- 
'For example ,   fo r   p rob lems   i nvo lv ing ,  s a y ,  15  s t a t e  v a r i a b l e s  
(Pr iva te   Communica t ion :  B. Morgan, AF Academy). 
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e x i s t .  O f  c o u r s e ,  t h i s  s ta te  o f  affairs  s h o u l d   n o t  be s u r p r i s i n e  
s i n c e  we c a n n o t  e v e n  s o l v e  t h e  g e n e r a l  c l o s e d - l o o p  o p t i m a l  c o n t r o l  
p r o b l e m .   S u b o p t i m a l   c l o s e d - l o o p   s o l u t i o n s   t o   d i f f e r e n t i a l  games 
may be o b t a i n e d   u s i n g   s u c c e s s i v e   a p p r o x i m a t i o n   p r o c e d u r e s .  The 
t e c h n i q u e  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  t o  o p t i m i z e , r e p e a t e d l y  a n d  a l t e r n a t e l y ,  
t h e  s t r a t e g y  o f  o n e  p l a y e r  whi le  h o l d i n g  f i x e d  t h e  strateey o f  
the o t h e r  p l a y e r .  It can  be shown t h a t  t h e  s u c c e s s i v e  maximum 
and minimum v a l u e s  a t t a i n e d  by t h e  payoff bound t h e  s a d d l e p o i n t  
v a l u e .  
Aerial Combat Problems 
To our  knowledge, t h e  most   comple te   survey   of  a e r i a l  combat 
problems i s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  1967 Rand r e p o r t  by  Greene  and 
Hun tz i cke r  ( R e f . 2 4 ) .  They d i v i d e   r e s e a r c h   i n  t h i s  area i n t o  t h e  
s i x  c a t e g o r i e s  l i s ted  below. 
(1) I n s t r u c t i o n a l  material, h i s t o r i c a l   d e s c r i p t i o n s ,   a n d  t e s t  
documenta t ion .  
( 2 )  S t u d i e s   o f   s u b s y s t e m s :  These  s t u d i e s  deal  most ly  w i t h  p e r -  
formance  of   ordnance  subsystems  and  of  a i r c r a f t .  ( A  n o t a b l e  ex- 
ample of the  s i rc raf t  performance s t u d i e s  i s  t h e  "energy maneuv- 
e r a b i l i t y "  work of  Rutowski  (Ref .25 ) .  ) 
( 3 )  Game- theore t i c   s tud ie s  of d u e l s :  Despite t h e  t i t l e ,  t h i s  
work   does   no t   i nc lude   r e sea rch  i n  d i f f e r e n t i a l  games. I n s t e a d ,  
i t  c o v e r s  e a r l y  e f f o r t s  t o  a p p l y  ordinary_ game t h e o r y  t o  p r o b l e m s  
o f  o r d n a n c e  s e l e c t i o n  a n d  t i m i n g  o f  f i r i n g .  
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( 4 )  Detailed s t u d i e s   o f   c o m b i n e d  sys t em per formance  ( f i g h t e r  v s .  
p red ic t ab le  t a r g e t ) :  F i g h t e r  vs.   bomber  problems are  t y p i c a l  o f  
t h e  e x a m p l e s   s t u d i e d  here.  These e f f o r t s  were i n s p i r e d  largely 
by p o s t  World War I1 i n t e r e s t  i n  bomber defense.  
( 5 )  Air-Battle s i m u l a t i o n s :  The problems here i n v o l v e   e x t e n s i v e  
s i m u l a t i o n   s t u d i e s   o f  a e r i a l  ba t t l e s  i n v o l v i n g   s q u a d r o n s   o f  a i r -  
c r a f t .  R e s o u r c e   a l l o c a t i o n ,  ra ther  tha;.  t h e  d e t a i l s  o f   c o n t r o l  
a c t i o n ,  i s  t h e  p r i m a r y  item of  i n t e r e s t  i n  these  s t u d i e s .  
( 6 )  Duel   be tween  maneuver ing   vehic les :  As n o t e d  ea r l i e r ,  t h i s  
t y p e  of problem has become i m p o r t a n t  a g a i n  as a r e su l t  o f  V ie tnam.  
We s h a l l  d e v o t e  t h e  rest of  t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  t o  t h e  l a s t  o f  
t h e  above   ca t egor i e s ,   i nasmuch  as t h i s  s t u d y  was aimed a t  ae r i a l  
combat  problems t h a t  f a l l  w i t h i n  t h i s  c l a s s .  It i s  u s e f u l   t o  
d i s t i n g u i s h   t w o   s u b - c a t e g o r i e s   o f  ( 6 ) :  t h e  missile v s .  missile 
s i t u a t i o n  t y p i f i e d  by  t h e  MIRV-ABIV! example;  and t h e  f i g h t e r  v s .  
f i g h t e r  s i t u a t i o n  i n v o l v i n g  t h e  a c t i o n  o f  human p i l o t s .  
I n  t h e  missile v s .  missile c a s e ,  t h e  dynamica l   equa t ions   can  
o f t e n  b e  approximated  by r e l a t i v e l y  simple k i n e m a t i c  laws because  
o f  t h e  h i g h  a c c e l e r a t i o n s  a n d  s h o r t  e n g a g e m e n t  times I n v o l v e d  i n  
t h e  d u e l .  T h i s  w i l l  h e l p  t o  s i m p l i f y  any d i f f e r e n t i a l  games that  
are f o r m u l a t e d   i n   c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  these  problems.   Foreover ,   con-  
t r o l  s t r a t eg ie s  are  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  t h e  mos t  impor t an t  cons ide ra -  
t i o n  here  and much o f  t h e  work i n  c a t e g o r y  ( 5 )  may b e  a p p l i c a b l e .  
The f i g h t e r  v s .  f i g h t e r  due l ,   which  i s  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  i n t e r e s t  
here ,  appears t o  be t h e  more  complex  problem.  Such  duels a re  
o f t e n  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by s t r e n u o u s  m a n e u v e r s  i n  th ree  d imens ions .  
Rapid c h a n g e s  i n  a l t i t u d e ,  v e l o c i t y  a n d ,  h e n c e ,  i n  t u r n  r a d i u s  
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f o r  a given l o a d  f a c t o r ,  as well as l a r g e  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  l i f t ,  
t h r u s t  and d r a g  are e x p e r i e n c e d   f r e q u e n t l y .   T h i s   r e n d e r s  much 
o f  the a n a l y s i s  d o n e  ear l ie r  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  bomber defense 
(where c o n s t a n t  a l t i t u d e  a n d  v e l o c i t y  are a s s u m e d )  q u i t e  i n a p p l i c -  
able .  I n  terms of   p roblem  complexi ty ,  the fac t  tha t  t h e  opponent 
i s  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  be inteZZigent i s  pe rhaps  o f  greater s i g n i f i c a n c e .  
T h i s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  leads t o  a k i n d  o f  s e q u e n t i a l  d e c i s i o n  p r o b l e m  
t h a t  o n l y  r e c e n t l y  has b e g u n  t o  r e c e i v e  a t t e n t i o n .  
The-Simulat ion - A p p r o a c h - - S e v e r a l   e f f o r t s   h a v e   b e e n   u n d e r t a k e n  
t o  p r o d u c e  a three d imens iona l ,  two-s ided  s imula t ion  o f  maneuver -  
i n g   a i r - c o m b a t .  The D i f f e r e n t i a l   M a n e u v e r i n g   S i m u l a t o r   t o  b e  i n -  
s t a l l e d  a t  Langley  Research  Center  i s  one  o f  s eve ra l  no tewor thy  
s i m u l a t i o n  attempts (Refs .26-29) .  The v a l u e   o f   s i m u l a t o r s  as a n  
e f f e c t i v e  r e s e a r c h  tool for  s tudying  complex  problems i s  well- 
known; b u t  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  comple t e   r e l i ance   on  
s i m u l a t i o n   s t u d i e s  are a l s o   c l e a r l y   u n d e r s t o o d .   S i m u l a t i o n  i s  
not   economica l  when i t  i s  u s e d   i n  a b l ind ,   sho tgun   manner .  I t s  
e f f i c i e n t  u t i l i z a t i o n  d e p e n d s  o n  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  i d e n t i f y  i n t e r -  
e s t i n g  p r o b l e m  areas and t o  d e f i n e  c r i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n s  a n d  param- 
e te rs  w i t h i n  these areas. I n  t h i s  regard ,  a n a l y t i c a l  r e s u l t s ,  
e v e n  f o r  s i m p l i f i e d  problems,  can  b e  m o s t  h e l p f u l  i n s o f a r  as t h e y  
s e r v e  t o  d e f i n e  s i t u a t i o n s  t h a t  war ran t  more d e t a i l e d  s t u d y  
t h r o u g h  s i m u l a t i o n .  
The U s e f u l n e s s   o f  - D i f f e r e n t i a l  Game Theory--The r a i s o n  d ' e t r e  
f o r  d i f f e r e n t i a l  game t h e o r y  i s  t h e  s t u d y  o f  d e c i s i o n  p r o b l e m s  of 
t h e  t y p e  e n c o u n t e r e d   i n   f i g h t e r   v s .  f i g h t e r  d u e l s .   T h u s ,  i t  i s  
n a t u r a l  t o  e x p e c t  t h a t  attempts t o  a p p l y  t h e  t h e o r y  t o  s u c h  p r o b -  
lems would be  made and t h i s  i s  indeed  t h e  c a s e .   F o r  example, 
d i f f e r e n t i a l  game t h e o r y  has b e e n  u s e d  t o  s t u d y  t h e  c o n t r o l  p o l i -  
c i e s  f o r  a i r c r a f t  d u r i n g  s h o r t  e n g a F e m e n t s  i n  w h i c h  t h e  i n i t i a l  
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c o n d i t i o n s  are reasonab ly  we l l -de f ined  and  r ange  ove r  a small set  
o f  v a l u e s .  T h i s  k i n d  o f  s t u d y  has been  carr ied o u t  a t  t he  Air 
Force  Academyt and  a t  Randtt ,  It is u s e f u l  f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  s imple 
maneuver s t ra teg ies  f o r  human p i l o t s  t o  f o l l o w .  
Another  area i n  w h i c h  d i f f e r e n t i a l  game t h e o r y  has been use-  
f u l  i s  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  r e g i o n s  i n  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p o s i t i o n -  
v e l o c i t y  s t a t e  space t h a t  are f a v o r a b l e   t o   e a c h   a i r c r a f t .  Para- 
m e t r i c  s t u d i e s  o f  t h e  t r a d e o f f s  b e t w e e n  d e s i g n  parameters o f  t he  
a i r c r a f t  a n d  v a r i a t i o n s  o f  t h e  b o u n d a r i e s  o f  these r e g i o n s  c a n  
y i e l d  m e a n i n g f u l   i n s i g h t s .  As n o t e d   a b o v e ,   s u c h   a n a l y s e s  are 
a l s o  u s e f u l  i n  c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  s i m u l a t i o n   s t u d i e s .  The problem 
of  t h e  Homocidal  Chauffeur  due t o  I s a a c s  ( R e f . 3 )  i s  a p r ime  example 
o f  t h i s  k i n d   o f   a n a l y s i s .  The e f f o r t s  o f  Breakwell and Nerz 
( R e f . 2 0 1 ,  Meier (Ref .30 ) ,   and  Miller (Ref .31 )  a l l  f a l l  w i t h i n  
t h i s  c a t e g o r y   o f   i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  We h a v e   a l s o   f o l l o w e d  t h i s  ap- 
p roach  somewhat i n  o u r  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  dogf igh t  p rob lem,  t o  b e  
d e s c r i b e d  i n  Chapter 5 .  
All of t h e  a b o v e  s t u d i e s  h a v e  dea l t  w i t h  problems t h a t  were 
g rea t ly  s i m p l i f i e d .  None o f  them have l e d  t o   F e n e r a 1   t e c h n i a u e s  
f o r  t r e a t i n g  more compl i ca t ed  f i g h t e r  v s .  f i g h t e r  p r o b l e m s  i n  a n  
e f f i c a c i o u s  way. T h i s  i s  n o t  s u r p r i s i n p  i n  view  of t h e  p r e v i o u s l y  
m e n t i o n e d  a n a l y t i c  a n d  n u m e r i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  d i f -  
f e r e n t i a l  games. On t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  i t  wou ld   have   been   a s ton i sh ing  
i f  such  methods had emerged from these s t u d i e s .   I n d e e d ,   f r o m  our 
v a n t a g e  p o i n t ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  general t e c h n i q u e s  
f o r  t h e  ” d i r e c t   s o l u t i o n   o f   d i f f e r e n t i a l  games w i l l  become a v a i l -  
able  i n  t h e  n e a r  f u t u r e .  
‘Private  Communication: B.  Morgan. 




What t h e n  are t h e  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  s o l v i n g  more compl i ca t ed  
f i g h t e r  vs.  f igh te r  combat  problems? It seems t o  u s  tha t  there 
e x i s t s  a p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  s o l u t i o n  t h a t  h e r e t o f o r e  has no t  been  
s e r i o u s l y   e x p l o r e d .  The a p p r o a c h   i n v o l v e s  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n   o f  
Markov game t h e o r y .  It i s  based p r i m a r i l y   o n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  as- 
sumpt ions :  ( i) p i l o t s  c a n  o n l y  r e s o l v e  t h e  s t a t e  s p a c e  t o  a f i n i t e  
degree o f   accu racy ;   and  (ii) p i l o t s  c h o o s e  t h e i r  maneuvers  from 
a f i n i t e   c o l l e c t i o n   o f   p o s s i b l e   m a n e u v e r s .  With these as sumpt ions ,  
t h e  a i r  combat problem can b e  r e d u c e d  t o  o n e  o f  c o n t r o l l a b l e  
Markov c h a i n s .  From b o t h  a n  a n a l y t i c a l  a n d  a c o m p u t a t i o n a l  s t a n d -  
p o i n t ,  t h i s  problem i s  much simpler t h a n  a "co r re spond ing"  d i f -  
f e r e n t i a l  game. 
The Markov game a p p r o a c h  t o  a e r i a l  combat  problems w i l l  b e  
d e s c r i b e d  i n  d e t a i l  i n  t h e  nex t   Chap te r .   Be fo re   end inp  t h i s  d i s -  
cuss ion ,   however ,  w e  s h o u l d  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  approach  i s  n o t  com- 
p l e t e l y  d i v o r c e d   f r o m   d i f f e r e n t i a l  pames. I n   f a c t ,   a l t h o u g h  t h i s  
i s  - no t  t h e  v i ewpo in t  w e  p r e fe r ,  one   can   th ink   of  t h e  t e c h n i q u e  
as a way o f  o b t a i n i n g  a p p r o x i m a t e  s o l u t i o n s  t o  d i f f e r e n t i a l  pames. 
We will s a y  more  about t h i s  l a t e r .  
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3 .  A COMPUTATIONAL  APPROACH TO AERIAL COMBAT PROBLEMS 
We h a v e  j u s t  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  a n  a p p r o a c h  t o  t h e  s o l u t i o n  o f  
manned aer ia l  combat  problems that  i n v o l v e s  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  
Markov game t h e o r y   c o u l d   p r o v e   m o s t   f r u i t f u l .   I n  th is  c h a p t e r  
w e  deve lop   such   an   approach .  We b e g i n  by showing how t h e  i n t r o -  
d u c t i o n  of two p h y s i c a l l y  mot iva t ed  a s sumpt ions  leads t o  t h e  
f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  the ae r i a l  combat problem as a m e a n i n g f u l  d i s c r e -  
t i z e d  game. Then,   concepts  of Markov p rocess   and  s ta te  inc remen t  
dynamic  programming are u s e d  t o  d e v e l o p  a f eas ib l e  c o m p u t a t i o n a l  
s c h e m e   f o r   s o l v i n p  t h i s  game. Two examples t h a t  d e m o n s t r a t e  t he  
a p p l i c a t i o n  of  t h e  t e c h n i q u e  are p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  n e x t  c h a p t e r .  
Problem Formulat ion 
As we saw i n  Chapter 1, a n  ae r i a l  combat  between two vehicles  
may b e  descr ibed ma themat i ca l ly  as a z e r o - s u m  d i f f e r e n t i a l  game. 
F o r  ease o f  r e f e r e n c e ,  we repea t  below t h e  e q u a t i o n s  tha t  s e r v e  t o  
d e f i n e  s u c h  a game: 
I x ( T ) E R  ; T = f r ee  ( 3 . 4 )  
B r i e f l y ,  t h e  components of - x ( t )   r e p r e s e n t  t h e  a i r c r a f t s '  p o s i t i o n s ,  
v e l o c i t i e s ,  e t c . ,  a t  some time t ;  t h e  game t e r m i n a t e s  a t  t h e  f i rs t  
time T t h a t  - x e n t e r s  a p r e s c r i b e d  c a p t u r e  r e g i o n  R ;  and ,  t h e  ob jec -  
t i v e   o f  t h e  game i s  t o   f i n d   c o n t r o l  s t ra teRies  - U*EU and V*EV -. t h a t  
y i e l d  a s a d d l e p o i n t  o f  J .  
Most  of t h e  work i n  zero-sum games assumes p e r f e c t  i n f o r m a t i o n .  
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  i n  manned a e r i a l  combat s i t u a t i o n s  t h e  p i l o t s  
rarely have  prec ise  knowledpe  of  t he  s t a t e  - x ( t )  and must base t h e i r  
c o n t r o l  a c t i o n s  o n  i m p r e c i s e  estimates o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  s t a t e  o f  p l a y .  
We have attempted t o  i n c l u d e  t h i s  p h y s i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t  d i r e c t l y  
i n  t h e  p rob lem  fo rmula t ion .  Our approach  i s  t o  decompose t h e  
s t a t e - s p a c e  X ( o r  a c t u a l l y  a c o m p a c t i f i e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  x o f  X )  
i n t o  a f i n i t e  n u m b e r  o f  d i s j o i n t  b l o c k s  S O , S I y . .  . 'SN. These b l o c k s  
may be o f  a rb i t r a ry  s i z e  a n d  shape and szf, isfy 
t - I - 
As a n  example,  c o n s i d e r  a game p l a y e d  i n  a h o r i z o n t a l  p l a n e  
w i t h  b o t h   c o n b a t a n t s   h a v i n p   c o n s t a n t   v e l o c i t y .  Here t h e  b l o c k s  
Si cou ld  be  m e a n i n c f u l l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  c r u d e  p o s i t i o n  estimates 
( e . g . ,  c l o c k   a n p l e s - o f f   a n d   s u i t a b l e  r a n p e  d i s c r e t i z a t i o n s )  . 
'In o r d e r  f o r  t h e  d e c o m p o s i t i o n  t o  b e  f i n i t e ,  X can  be a r t i f i -  
t t  
c i a l l y  b o u n d e d  by l e t t i n g  11x1 I=C = arbi t rary be a r e f l e c t i n g  
o r  a n  a b s o r b i n g  bar r ie r .  In-the l a t t e r  c a s e  t h e  game ends  when- 
e v e r  I lE lPC1.  
tfAn example of such  a game w i t h  t h i s  t y p e  o f  s ta te-space decom- 
p o s i t i o n  i s  s t u d i e d  i n  C h a p t e r  4.  
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We assume tha t  b o t h  p l a y e r s  know t h e  sys tem s t a t e  o n l y  t o  
w i t h i n  a block Si ;  a p l a y e r  c a n n o t  d i s c e r n  where t h e  s t a t e  i s  
w i t h i n  S i ,  b u t  o n l y  t h e  f ac t  tha t  - x ( t )  i s  somewhere (wi th , e .g . ,  
u n i f o r m  p r o b a b i l i t y )  i n  t h e  known b lock .   Thus ,  t h e  o r i g i n a l  
s t a t e - s p a c e  has b e e n  d i s c r e t i z e d  and t h e  b l o c k s  Si may be though t  
of as "states" for a d i s c r e t e  game. 
T r a n s i t i o n s  f r o m  b l o c k  t o  b l o c k ,  i . e . ,  changes i n  s t a t e ,  take 
p l a c e   u n d e r  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of a p p r o p r i a t e  c o n t r o l  a c t i o n s .  We may 
a l s o  d i s c r e t i z e  the c o n t r o l  s p a c e s  i n  a meaningfu l  way. I n  p a r t i c u -  
l a r ,  w e  assume t h a t  t h e  p l a y e r s '  c o n t r o l  s t r a t e g i e s  are c o n s t r u c t e d  
f r o m  f i n i t e  sets of " c a n o n i c a l  c o n t r o l  m a n e u v e r s , "  
These sets  can   encompass   bas ic   cont ro l   maneuvers   such  as v a r i o u s  
g t u r n s ,   s h a r p   p u l l - u p s   o r   d i v e s .  They c a n   a l s o   i n c l u d e  more 
spec ia l i zed  o r  complex  maneuver s  such  as a "scissors" o r  a "yo-yo". 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , t h e  se t s  Ua and V cou ld  be composed  of  various 
gu idance  laws ( e . g . ,  d i r e c t  p u r s u i t ,  p r o p o r t i o n a l  n a v i g a t i o n ,  e t c . ) .  
I n  any  case ,  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  m a n e u v e r  by a p l a y e r  
c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  h i s  c h o o s i n g  a p a r t i c u l a r  " c o n t r o l  h i s t o r y "  t o  b e  
employed  over  some  subsequent time i n t e r v a l .  
B 
N o t i c e  t h a t  t h i s  form of c o n t r o l  d i s c r e t i z a t i o n  i s  q u i t e  
d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  t h a t  o r d i n a r i l y  u s e d  i n  s o l v i n g  o p t i m a l  c o n t r o l  p r o b -  
lems n u m e r i c a l l y .  We h a v e   n o t   q u a n t i z e d  t h e  r a n g e   o f   c o n t r o l  
v a l u e s .  Rather, we h a v e   d i s c r e t i z e d  t h e  s p a c e   o f   c o n t r o l   f u n c t i o n s ,  
i . e . ,  we have  r e s t r i c t e d  t h e  p l a y e r s  to a f i n i t e  set  of c o n t r o l  
c h o i c e s  o r  d e c i s i o n s .  
I 
The a p p r o a c h  t o  d i s c r e t i z i n g  t h e  c o n t r o l  space was a l s o  m o t i -  
vated by p h y s i c a l   c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  It is  based on t h e  bel ief  t h a t  
p i l o t s  l e a r n  c e r t a i n  " s t y l i z e d "  m a n e u v e r s  i n  t r a i n i r , g  f o r  ae r ia l  
combat.  Then, i n  a ba t t l e ,  a p i l o t  s e l ec t s  a p a r t i c u l a r   m a n e u v e r  
t ha t  bes t  s e r v e s  h i s  g o a l s  based on a r e l a t i v e l y  c r u d e  a s s e s s m e n t  
of h i s  s i t u a t i o n   v i s - a - v i s  h i s  opponent .  It i s  easy t o  see how 
t h e  combined  cont ro l  and  s t a t e  space d i s c r e t i z a t i o n s  r e f l e c t  t h i s  
s i t u a t i o n .  
I n  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n  i t  i s  shown how t h e  above  assumpt ions  
r e d u c e  t h e  a e r i a l  combat "game" t o  a problen!  of c o n t r o l l a b l e  
Markov c h a i n s ,  i . e . ,  t o  a d i s c r e t e  Markov game. The s o l u t i o n   o f  
t h e  d i s c r e t i z e d  game i s  a b l u e p r i n t  f o r  o p t i m a l  p l a y ,  i . e . ,  a way 
of  dec id ing  which  cont ro l  maneuver  i s  b e s t  t o  u s e  i n  e a c h  of t h e  
p e r c e i v e d  s t a t e s  Si ( i n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  a p a i r  of  o p t i m a l  s t ra teg ies  
o r  f e e d b a c k  c o n t r o l  laws). 
The Discre t ized  Game 
We are  now i n  a p o s i t i o n  t o  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  a e r i a l  combat 
problem by a game d e f i n e d   o v e r  a d i s c r e t i z e d   d o m a i n .  To accom- 
p l i s h  t h i s ,  l e t  us   suppose  t ha t  a p a r t i c u l a r  p a i r  of maneuvers 
( ~ E U ~ , ~ & V  ) h a v e   b e e n   s e l e c t e d  b y  t h e  p l a y e r s .  Then, a g iven  
s t a t e  - x ( t )  wou ld  evo lve  to  some new v a l u e  u n d e r  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of 
t h e  dynamic   equat ions  of motion ( 3 . 1 ) .  However, t h e  " a c t u a l "  
s t a t e  - x ( t )  i s  n o t  known; a l l  t h a t  i s  known i s  t h a t  - x ( t ) E S i .  Hence, 
a p a r t i c u l a r  t r a j e c t o r y  c a n n o t  b e  " fo l lowed"  and  t h e  most t h a t  
one  can  hope t o  d e t e r m i n e  are t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  o f  t r a n s i t i o n s  
be tween b locks ,  under  t h e  a c t i o n  of  a p a r t i c u l a r  m a n e u v e r  p a i r .  
We d e f i n e  
B 
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p I J ( ~ , ~ )  = p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  b l o c k  Si b 
t o   b l o c k  S w i t h  maneuver s   (u ,v ) . t  3 "
It i s  c lear  that  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  w i l l  p l a y  t h e  same 
r o l e  i n  t h e  d i scre te  game t h a t ' t h e  e q u a t i o n s  o f  s t a t e  ( 3 . 1 )  p l a y e d  
i n  t h e  c o n t i n u o u s  game. Inasmuch as w e  assume that  So = R i s  a n  
a b s o r b i n g  s t a t e ,  we have  
0 I # O  
1 i=o p o i  = { 
which i s  e q u i v a l e n t   t o  t he  " s t o p p i n p "  r u l e  o f   ( 3 . 4 ) .  Only i n  
rare cases w i l l  i t  b e  p o s s i b l e   t o   d e t e r m i n e  t h e  p ' s  a n a l y t i c a l l y .  
However, t h e y  c a n  u s u a l l y  b e  o b t a i n e d  n u m e r i c a l l y  ( e . g . ,  by Monte- 
Car lo   me thods ) .  A t e c h n i q u e   f o r   c o r n p u t i n p  the  p ' s  w i l l  b e  d i s -  
cussed  l a t e r .  
i j  
i j  
The f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  p r o b l e m  as a d i s c r e t e  Markov 
game i n  w h i c h  t r a n s i t i o n s  from a n y  g i v e n s t a t e , S i ,  t o  any o t h e r  
s t a t e ,  S are a l l o w e d   w o u l d   r e q u i r e   s t o r a E e   o f  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  p ( u , v )  f o r  a l l  i=1, ..., N, j=1, ..., N and a l l  u*f3 
pa i r s  - u , ~ .  If N i s  1000 and each p l a y e r  has a cho ice  o f  a=f3=5 
p o s s i b l e   m a n e u v e r s ,   o n e   w o u l d   h a v e   t o   s t o r e  25 x 1 0  numbers - a n  
u n r e a s o n a b l e   r e q u i r e m e n t   f o r   m o s t   c o m p u t e r   f a c i l i t i e s .   F o r t u n a t e l y ,  
there i s  a way o f  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  r e d u c i n g  t h e  s t o r a g e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
and computat ional  demands of  a c o n v e n t i o n a l  Markov game f o r m u l a t i o n .  
The approach  i s  based on t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  problem and uses con- 
c e p t s  of Larson ' s   " s ta te - increment   dynamic   p rogramming."   (Ref .32)  
3 '  
i j  - - 
6 
' A l t e r n a t i v e l y  pij(g,v) can  be  regarded as the  f r a c t i o n  o f  s ta tes  
i n  b l o c k s i t h a t  are d r i v e n  ( e v o l v e )  i n t o  b l o c k  S 3' 
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I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  w e  assume t h a t  once t h e  p l a y e r s  c h o o s e  t h e i r  con- 
t r o l  maneuvers 
” u , v   i n  a g i v e n  s t a t e  Si,  t h e y  m u s t  c o n t i n u e  t o  
employ these m a n e u v e r s   u n t i l  a change i n  s t a t e  ( t o ,  s a y ,  Sj) 
occur s ;  once  a s ta te  t r a n s i t i o n  i s  p e r c e i v e d ,  t h e  p l a y e r s  may 
c h a n g e   t o  a d i f f e r e n t   m a n e u v e r .  T h i s  i s  a p p e a l i n g   f r o m  a phys- 
i c a l  v i e w p o i n t  s i n c e  c o n t r o l  d e c i s i o n s  are  made on t h e  basis o f  
p e r c e i v e d  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  w h i c h  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  c h a n g e s  o n l y  when S +S 
t r a n s i t i o n s   o c c u r .   I n   o t h e r   w o r d s ,  a new d e c i s i o n  i s  made based 
on t h e  perceived outcome o f  t h e  o l d  d e c i s i o n .  
i 3  
From a mathematical v i ewpo in t  t h i s  means t h a t ,  i n  one stage,  
s t a t e  t r a n s i t i o n s  a re  r e s t r i c t e d  t o   o n l y   a d j a c e n t  - b l o c k s   b e f o r e  
t h e  p l a y e r s  r e o p t i m i z e  o v e r  t h e i r  se t s  of a l lowable  maneuvers  
( see  F i g .  1) .  The n e t  e f f e c t  i s  a t r e m e n d o u s   r e d u c t i o n   i n  t h e  
amount  of  numbers p ( g , ~ )  t h a t  must b e  s t o r e d .   F o r  a three-  
d imens iona l  s t a t e  s p a c e  ( d i s c r e t i z e d  r e c t a n g u l a r l y )  a n d  t h e  num- 
bers g i v e n  e a r l i e r ,  we now need t o  s t o r e  o n l y  25m1000*33 = 675 ,000  
numbers ( i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  25 mi l l ion   numbers   needed  i f  t r a n s i -  
t i o n s  b e t w e e n  a l l  b l o c k s  are  a l l o w e d ) .  
id 
To comple t e  ou r  fo rmula t ion  o f  a d i s c r e t e  Markov game we 
m u s t   d e l i n e a t e  t h e  g o a l s   o f   t h e  pame. We b e g i n  b y  d e f i n i n g  
3 t h e  a v e r a g e  c o s t  o f  a t r a n s i t i o n  
Si t o  S u s i n p  t h e  maneuver   pa i r  3 
A t  t h i s  p o i n t ,  we n e e d n ’ t  r e l a t e  t h e  c t o  t h e  c o n t i n u o u s  d i f -  
f e r e n t i a l  game p a y o f f ,  b u t  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  d o  s o  i f  des i r ed .  
S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  we can  wr i t e  
i J  
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where L i s  the  i n t e g r a n d  of t h e  p a y o f f  o f  Eq.  ( 3 . 3 ) ,  x j  i s  t h e  
c e n t r o i d  of   block S and A (&,x) i s  t h e  "ave rage"  time o f  a 
t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  Si t o  S u s i n g  t h e  p a i r  ( u , v )  .t Then, e .p .  , i f  
- 
s i d  
j " 
L E  1, c i j  ( u , v )  - - i s  t h e  a v e r a g e  time t o  go from Si 
to 
The c ' s  are  " o n e - s t a g e "   c o s t s  t h a t  w i l l  accumula te  as 
i j  
t r a n s i t i o n s   b e t w e e n   d i s c r e t e  s t a t e s  o c c u r .  The  t o t a l  c o s t  w i l l  
depend  on t h e  i n i t i a l  s t a t e  and  on t h e  " st rategies  - employed by t h e  
p layers .  R e c a l l  t h a t  a s t ra tegy  c o r r e s p o n d s   t o  a c o n t r o l   c h o i c e  
f o r   e v e r y  s ta te  o f  t h e  game. Hence, we d e f i n e  a u - s t r a t e g y  ( o r  
p o l i c y ) ,  m u ,  as a s e t  of N c o n t r o l  m a n e u v e r s  ( o n e  f o r  e a c h  s t a t e ) ,  
i . e . ,  TT = {g(l),g(2),...,g(N)} ; g ( i ) E U , ,  such  t h a t  t h e  maneuver 
- u ( i )  i s  a p p l i e d  whenever t h e  s t a t e  of  t h e  game i s  S i .++  A similar 
d e f i n i t i o n  i s  made f o r  lrv. We d e n o t e  t h e  t o t a l  c o s t  i n c u r r e d  f o r  
a game s t a r t i n g  i n  Si and p l a y e d  w i t h  t h e  p o l i c y  p a i r  lr = (rU,lrv) 
b y  V I T ( i ) .  Cle .ar ly ,  V * ( i )  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  e q u a t i o n  
U 
N 
Note t h a t  t h e  summation  need  only b e  t a k e n   o v e r   b l o c k s  S a d j a c e n t  
t o  S i .  The g o a l   o f  t h e  game i s  t h e n  t o  f i n d  a s t r a t e g y  p a i r  
IT* = (IT~,T;) such  t h a t  
J 
V"*(i)  = Min Max V I T ( i )  = Max Min V I T ( i ) ,  f o r  a l l  i ( 3 . 9 )  
T I T  u v  I T l r  v u  
tBy assuming t h a t  maneuvers  change  only  upon a c h a n g e  i n  p e r c e i v e d  
"We see that  s t ra teg ies  are merely f e e d b a c k  c o n t r o l  laws d e f i n e d  
s t a t e ,  time becomes, i n  e f f e c t ,  a d e p e n d e n t   v a r i a b l e .  
o v e r  t h e  s p a c e  - x. 
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I 
T h i s   c o m p l e t e s   t h e   f o r m u l a t i o n   o f  t h e  Markov  game. To re- 
c a p i t u l a t e ,  the  r e l a t i o n  o f  t h i s  game t o  t h e  c o n t i n u o u s  d i f f e r e n -  
t i a l  game f o r m u l a t e d  ear l ier  i s  as f o l l o w s :  t h e  d i s c r e t e   " p e r -  
c e i v e d "  states, S i ,  r e p l a c e  the c o n t i n u o u s  s ta te  - x ( t ) ;  t h e  t r a n s l -  
t i o n   p r o b a b i l i t i e s ,  p i J   (u ,v ) ,  " p l a y  t h e  r o l e   o f   " e q u a t i o n s   o f  
motion"; t h e  d e l i n e a t i o n  o f  So a n d  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  poi (Eq.3.6), 
p r o v i d e  t h e  e q u i v a l e n t  t e r m i n a t i o n  c r i t e r i o n ;  a n d ,  t he  o b j e c t i v e  
of f i n d i n g  a n  o p t i m a l  s t r a t e g y  p a i r  T *  that satisfies Eq. ( 3 . 9 )  
r e p l a c e s  t h e  g o a l   o f   f i n d i n g  a p a i r   ( u * , v * )  " tha t  p r o v i d e s  a 
s a d d l e p o i n t   o f  Eq. ( 3 . 3 ) .  I n  t h e  n e x t   s e c t i o n  we d iscuss   methods  
f o r  s o l v i n g  t h i s  d i s c r e t e  Markov game. 
S o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  Markov Game 
There  has b e e n  c o n s i d e r a b l e  e f f o r t  d e v o t e d  t o  t h e  a n a l y t i c  
s t u d y  o f  Markov c h a i n s  w i t h  c o n t r o l l a b l e  t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t i e s .  
I t e r a t i v e  s c h e m e s  f o r  t h e  s o l u t i o n  o f  s i n p l e  c o n t r o l  ( o n e - s i d e d  
game) problems appear i n  Howard (Ref . 3 3 ) ,  Zadeh and Eaton (Ref . 3 4 )  
and  Kushnerand  Kleinman  (Ref .35) .  An e x c e l l e n t  s t u d y  of  Markov 
games appears i n  C h a m b e r l a i n  ( R e f . 3 6 )  as well  as  i n K u s h n e r a n d  
Chamber la in   (Ref .37) .  I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  we p r e s e n t   a n   i t e r a t i v e  
t e c h n i q u e ,  based on  Refs .35-36 , tha t  can  be u s e d  t o  s o l v e  t h e  d i s -  
c r e t e  p r o b l e m  j u s t  f o r m u l a t e d .  
E,"" Corn u t a t i o n  of T r a n s i t i o n   P r o b a b i l i t i e s - - B e f o r e   d i s c u s s i n g  
t h e  i t e r a t i v e  t e c h n i q u e ,  we i n d i c a t e  t h e  method w e  u s e  t o  c o m p u t e  
n u m e r i c a l   v a l u e s   f o r  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n   p r o b a b i l i t i e s  p ( u , ~ ) .  It 
is  c l o s e l y  re la ted  t o  Monte-Carlo  methods. The first stape i n  
t h i s  p r o c e s s  i s  a l o g i c a l  s e q u e n t i a l  o r d e r i n g  of t h e  b l o c k s  {Si}. 
Fo r  a g i v e n  pair  of  maneuvers ( g , ~ ) ,  M p o i n t s  are un i fo rmly  d i s -  
t r i b u t e d '   o v e r  a g i v e n   b l o c k  Si. S t a r t i n a  a t  each one ,  - x(O)=S, - 
'Other random d i s t r i b u t i o n s  of s ta tes  w i t h i n  a b l o c k  c o u l d  a l t e r n a -  
i j  - 
t i v e l y  b e  c o n s i d e r e d .  
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of t h e  M p o i n t s ,  t h e  e q u a t i o n s  o f  m o t i o n  (3.1) are  i n t e g r a t e d  f o r -  
ward i n  time u n t i l  ~ ( 0 )  e n t e r s   a n   a d j a c e n t   b l o c k ,  say,  S j .  The 
time 
f o r  t h i s  t r a n s i t i o n  i s  r e c o r d e d .  Amin and *,ax 
t r a n s i t i o n  times, and are g e n e r a l l y  d i c t a t e d  by t h e  p h y s i c s  o f  t h e  
problem.  Note t h a t  A i J  (E,g,v) = Amax  on ly  i f  x(-) h a s  n o t  l e f t  
bound t h e  b l o c k  
b l o c k  Si. 
We l e t  N b e  t h e  number of p o i n t s  i n i t i a l l y  w i t h i n  Si t ha t  
j 
are d r i v e n   t o  S ( w i t h  t h e  g i v e n  s t ra teg ies  u and V I .  Then 
j - - 
and 
= a v e r a p e  t r a n s i t i o n  time from Si t o  S 
j 
F i n a l l y  , ( u , v )  i s  c a l c u l a t e d  ( e . g . ,  as i n  Ea. ( 3 . 7 ) ) .  The 
q u a n t i t i e s  c and p f o r  a l l  p a i r s   ( u , v )  are  p l a c e d   i n   c o m p u t e r  
s t o r a g e .  
cij - - 
t i j  i j  " 
I t e r a t i v e  T e c h n i q u e  f o r  Game Solut ion--The game s i t u a t i o n  i s  
now s p e c i f i e d  n u m e r i c a l l y  i n  terms of t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  
and t h e  "rewards" . The o r i g i n a l  system e q u a t i o n s  p l u s  a l l  % 
'Ac tua l ly   one   need   no t   s to re  a l l  t h e  c ' s  b u t   o n l y  t h e  N numbers 
i j  
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. 
s t o c h a s t i c  a n d  n o n l i n e a r  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  problem are a b s o r b e d ,  i n  
e s s e n c e ,  by t h e  p (&,x). The o r i g i n a l   c o s t   f u n c t i o n a l  i s  cha rac -  
t e r i z e d  by t h e  ciJ(g,v).  Note tha t  p does   no t   depend  on  t h e  
c o s t  f u n c t i o n a l  u s e d .  
i j  
i j  
To a p p l y  a n  i t e r a t i v e  scheme t o  t h e  problem, we first assume 
tha t  there e x i s t s  a p u r s u e r  p o l i c y  Pu such  t h a t ,  f o r  any  evader  
p o l i c y  m v ,  there e x i s t s  a f i n i t e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  c a p t u r e  
r e g i o n  So can  be reached i n  a f i x e d  number (N) o f  stages, regard- 
less o f  t h e  p o l i c y  m v  chosen .  T h i s  g u a r a n t e e s  t ha t  V ( i )  w i l l  
be f i n i t e  f o r  a l l  i . t  
TI* 
R e c a l l  t h a t  t h e  o p t i m a l  p o l i c y  m* = (n:,nC) and t h e  o p t i m a l  
c o s t  V * ( i )  sa t i s fy  E q s . ( 3 . 8 ) - ( 3 . 9 ) ,  i . e . ,  
A s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  m e t h o d  o f  s o l v i n g  f o r  V*(i) is g i v e n  by Chamber- 
l a i n   ( R e f . 3 6 ) .  The method i s  based on t h e  f o l l o w i n g :  
Theorem 1: I f ,  f o r  any N-vector - r 
'An a l t e r n a t e  a p p r o a c h  i s  t o  a r t i f i c i a l l y  bound V n ( i )  t o  b e  less 
t h a n  some f i x e d  c o n s t a n t  Vmax. 
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" 
t h e n  
a. There i s  a n   o p t i m a l   p o l i c y   p a i r  n* = (n:,~:) such  t ha t  
(np; )  
b .  The v a l u e   o f  t h e  game V* = V i s  t h e  un ique  limit 
of  t h e  sequence 
N 
We remark tha t  i f  c o n d i t i o n   ( 3 . 1 3 )  i s  n o t  s a t i s f i e d  ( i . e . ,  a 
s a d d l e p o i n t  c a n n o t  b e  g u a r a n t e e d )  t h e n  t h e  terms i n  braces i n  
E q s .  ( 3 . 1 4 ) - ( 3 . 1 5 )  a re  o m i t t e d .   I n  t h i s  c a s e  V*(i) i s  t h e  v a l u e  
o f  t h e  ma jo ran t  game; t h e  r e s u l t a n t  p o l i c i e s  (n:,nt) are  t h e  
m a j o r a n t  p o l i c i e s .  
The i t e r a t i v e  scheme  suggested by Ea. ( 3 . 1 5 )  bears a c l o s e  
s imi la r i ty  t o  t h e  J a c o b i  method f o r  s o l v i n g  t h e  l i n e a r  systems of  
s i m u l t a n e o u s  e q u a t i o n s  
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namely, t h e  a l g o r i t h m  
N 
V " ( i )  = &jv"-l ( j )  + ci ; vo = a r b i t r a r y  (3.17) 
j=1 
It i s  well-known t h a t  i f  t h e  J a c o b i  i t e r a t i o n s  c o n v e r g e ,  t h e n  t h e  
G a u s s - S e i d e l  i t e r a t i o n s  d e f i n e d  by  
w i l l  g e n e r a l l y   c o n v e r g e  f a s t e r  ( t o  V*) t h a n  w i l l  E q .  ( 3 . 1 7 ) .  
T h i s  f a c t  was f irst  e x p l o i t e d  by  Kushner and Kleinman  (Ref .35)  
t o  improve t h e  convergence  ra te  o f  s o l u t i o n s  t o  Markov c o n t r o l  
p r o c e s s e s   ( o n e - s i d e d  games). The e x t e n s i o n   t o  Markov games was 
s t u d i e d  by Chamber la in   (Ref .36) .  The  main r e s u l t  i s  
Theorem 2 :  If t h e  condi t ions   o f   Theorem 1 are  s a t i s f i e d ,  
t h e n  
a.  The sequence  v n ( i )  d e f i n e d  b y  
-
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b .  If T o ( i )  = 0 f o r  a l l  i t h e n  
and V " ( i ) ,  y n ( i )  c o n v e r g e  m o n o t o n i c a l l y  t o  V * ( i ) ,  
Thus,  t h e  i t e r a t i v e  scheme embodied i n  E q .  ( 3 . 1 9 )  is t o  b e  
preferred o v e r  tha t  of E q .  ( 3 . 1 5 ) .  One i s  g u a r a n t e e d   o f  a r a t e  
of  convergence  greater  t h a n  o r  e q u a l  t o  t h e  i t e r a t i o n s  o f  Theorem 
1. I n   a d d i t i o n ,  t he  scheme of  E q .  ( 3 . 1 9 )  r e q u i r e s  less computer 
s t o r a g e  s i n c e  t h e  v a l u e s  T n ( i )  are upda ted  as soon as t h e y  are 
o b t a i n e d ,  ra ther  t h a n  w a i t i n g  u n t i l  a l l  b locks  have  been  p rocessed .  
Summary 
I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  we have  p resen ted  a d i f f e r e n t  c o n c e p t u a l i z a -  
t i o n  o f  t h e  a i r - to -a i r   comba t   p rob lem.  Our approach  was based 
p r i m a r i l y  o n  t w o  p h y s i c a l  c o n c e p t s ,  o n e r e l a t l n g t o  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  se t s  and t h e  o t h e r r e l a t i n e t o  t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  con- 
t r o l  d e c i s i o n s .  T h i s  approach   a l lows  us  t o  view t h e  o r i p i n a l  
a e r i a l  combat  problem as a d i s c r e t e  Markov game, w i t h  a l l  s t o c h a s -  
t i c  a n d  n o n l i n e a r  e f f e c t s  b e i n g  a b s o r b e d  i n  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a -  
b i l i t i e s .  
A r e l a t i v e l y  new numer ica l  method,  based on t h e  Gauss-Siede l  
t e c h n i q u e  f o r  s o l v i n g  l i n e a r  e q u a t i o n s ,  p r o v i d e s  3 convergen t  a l -  
g o r i t h m   f o r   s o l v i n p :  t h e  problem. The r e s u l t l n e ,  s o l u t i o n  will pro-  
v i d e  t h e  o p t i m a l  s t ra teg ies  f o r  e a c h  p l a y e r .  
Our p rocedure  of a p p l y i n F  Markov t h e o r y  I s  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  
most o t h e r  a p p l i c a t i o n s  of Markov p r o c e s s e s  t o  c o n t i n u o u s  c o n t r o l  
problems.  We t r a n s f o r m  t h e  o r i g i n a l  p h y s i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  d i r e c t l y  
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i n t o  the c o n t e x t   o f  a d i s c r e t e  Markov game. We m a i n t a i n  t ha t  
when p h y s i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  are i n c o r p o r a t e d , i t  i s  t h i s  l a t t e r  prob-  
lem tha t  i s  more b a s i c  a n d  more c l o s e l y  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  a c t u a l  
combat s i t u a t i o n .  Other  approaches   (Refs .35   th rough 3 7 )  first 
app ly  Hami l ton - Jacob i  t heo ry  to  t h e  o r i g i n a l  c o n t i n u o u s  p r o b l e m .  
They t h e n  s o l v e  the r e s u l t a n t  H a m i l t o n - J a c o b i  p a r t i a l  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
e q u a t i o n  by a p a r t i c u l a r  d i s c r e t a t i o n  scheme that bears an  ana logy  
w i t h  Markov games. However,  no  Markov "game'! i s  a c t u a l l y   f o r m u l a t e d .  
I n  t he  f o l l o w i n g  c h a p t e r ,  w e  a p p l y  t h e  theory  and  the as so -  




4. TWO EXAMPLES 
I n  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  t h e  t h e o r y  a n d  c o m p u t a t i o n a l  schemes de- 
v e l o p e d  i n  C h a p t e r  3 are a p p l i e d  t o  s t u d y  a n a l o g u e s  o f  two well- 
known d i f f e r e n t i a l  game p r o b l e m s :   I s s a c s '   c l a s s i c   " H o m i c i d a l  
Chauffeur   Problem"  and t h e  more  complex "Two Car Prob lem."   In  
each  case we d i s c u s s  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  o u r  N a r k o v  f o r m u l a t i o n  i n  
l i g h t  o f  known a n a l y t i c  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  c o r r e -  
spond ing  con t inuous  game. 
Homicidal   Chauffeur   Problem 
The  Homicidal   Chauffeur   Problem i s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  d e t a i l  i n  
I s s a c s   ( R e f . 3 )   a n d   i n  B r e a k w e l l  and  Merz ( R e f . 2 0 ) .  B r i e f l y ,  a 
p u r s u e r  P ( chauf feu r )  mov inp  a t  c o n s t a n t  speed w1 w i t h  a f i n i t e  
minimum t u r n i n g  r a d i u s  R ,  c h a s e s  a n  e v a d e r  E ( p e d e s t r i a n )  nlovinp 
a t  a l o w e r  c o n s t a n t  speed w2 b u t  w i t h  a n  i n f i n i t e l y  small t u r n i n g  
r a d i u s .  T h e  pame e n d s   ( c a p t u r e )  when t h e  mutua l   d i s tance   becomes  
less  t h a n  a g i v e n   c a p t u r e   r a d i u s  L .  The p u r s u e r  s t r i v e s  t o  mini-  
mize t h e  t ime- to -cap tu re  w h i l e  t h e  e v a d e r  t r i e s  t o  rraximize i t .  
The  e q u a t i o n s  o f  m o t i c n  for t h i s  p r o b l e m ,  w r i t t e n  i n  a pur -  
s u e r  c e n t e r e d  s y s t e m  o f  c o o r d i n a t e s  a r e :  
W 
i = -2- y u + w 2  s i n  v 
W 1 
R 




( x , y )  = p o s i t i o n  o f  E r e l a t ive  t o  P 
u = p u r s u e r ' s  ra te  o f  t u r n  (PIS c o n t r o l ) ,  I u I  5 1 
v = r e l a t i v e  a n g l e  b e t w e e n  v e l o c i t y  v e c t o r s  o f  E 
and P ( E ' s  c o n t r o l )  
The parameter v a l u e s  u s e d  i n  o u r  s t u d y  o f  t h i s  problem were 
w1 = 1 . 0  , w2 = .7 , R = 1.5 , L = 1.0 
The a n a l y t i c  s o l u t i o n  t o  t he  above  problem is  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  
by a s e t  o f   s i n g u l a r   c u r v e s   i n  t h e  ( x - y )   s t a t e - s p a c e .  Using; 
Issacs' t e rmino logy ,  t h e  c u r v e s  c o n s i s t  o f  barriers,  dispersal 
c u r v e s ,   u n i v e r s a l   c u r v e s   a n d   e q u i v o c a l   l i n e s .  Some o f  these 
c u r v e s  are shown i n  F i g .  2 .  O f  t h e  v a r i o u s   s i n g u l a r   c u r v e s ,  t h e  
barr ier  appears t o  b e  most  impor tan t  f rom a p r a c t i c a l  p o i n t  o f  
view. Under o p t i m a l  p l a y ,  n o   t r a j e c t o r y   c a n  c ross  t h e  barr ier  and 
the  min-max time t o  c a p t u r e  i s  d i s c o n t i n u o u s  a c r o s s  t h i s  c u r v e .  
Moreover, t he  barr ier  ( a l o n g  w i t h  t h e  e q u i v o c a l  c u r v e )  s e r v e s  t o  
separate r e g i o n s   o f   d i f f e r e n t   p u r s u i t  s t ra tegy .  E s s e n t i a l l y ,  t h e  
o p t i m a l  p u r s u i t  strategy i s  t o  t u r n  hard  away from t h e  e v a d e r  when- 
e v e r  E i s  i n  t h e  r e g i o n  e n c l o s e d  by t h e  barr ier  and hard i n t o  E 
o t h e r w i s e .  [The o p t i m a l   p u r s u i t   c o n t r o l  i s  u=O, ( i . e . ,  a straight 
dash) on t h e  u n i v e r s a l  l i n e .  On t h e  dispersal  l i n e  u = + l ,  - i . e . ,  
e i t he r  c o n t r o l  c h o i c e  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  same o p t i m a l  c o s t . ]  A 
t y p i c a l  o p t i m a l   t r a j e c t o r y  ABCD i s  a l s o  shown i n  F ig .  2 .  T h i s  
t r a j e c t o r y  i s  based on E u s i n g  h i s  p e n e t r a t i n g  s t r a t e g y  [Ref .3]  on 
t h e  e q u i v o c a l  l i n e .  A t  p o i n t  B t h e  pu r sue r   swi t ches   f rom a hard 
t u r n  l e f t  (u=-1) t o  a h a r d  t u r n  r i g h t  ( u = + l )  a n d  he  s w i t c h e s  t o  a 
dash (u=O)  upon i n t e r s e c t i n g  the u n i v e r s a l  l i n e  a t  C .  
1 S i n c e  t h e  game i s  symmetric w i t h  respect t o  t h e  l i n e  x=O, t h e  
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U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  t h e  above i s  n o t  t h e  complete a n a l y t i c  solu- 
t i o n  t o  t h e  Homic ida l   Chauf feu r   p rob lem.   In  t h e  shaded r e g i o n  o f  
F ig .  2 the s o l u t i o n  i s  n o t   c o m p l e t e l y  known. Breakwell and Merz 
( R e f . 2 0 )  h a v e  s p e n t  c o n s i d e r a b l e  e f f o r t  t o w a r d s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
the n a t u r e  of t h e  s o l u t i o n  i n  t h i s  r e g i o n .  They found  numerous 
e s o t e r i c  s w i t c h  c u r v e s  a n d  e q u i v o c a l  c u r v e s  w i t h  which t o  c h a r a c -  
t e r i z e  t h e  o p t i m a l  s o l u t i o n ,  y e t  t h e  s o l u t i o n  i s  s t i l l  n o t  com- 
p l e t e d .  
A Computational Approach t o  t h e  Homicidal  Chauffeur  Problem 
Prob lem Refo rmula t ion - -Our  cha rac t e r i za t ion  o f  manned combat 
problems,   coupled  w i t h  t h e  computat ional   f ramework t h a t  we have  
deve loped ,  was a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  above  problem. We d e c i d e d  t o  de- 
compose t h e  state-space - X i n t o   b l o c k s  Si w i t h  r e s p e c t   t o  th.e 
p o l a r  c o o r d i n a t e s  ( r y e )  where 
These c o o r d i n a t e s  seem m o s t  n a t u r a l  f o r  a problem  of  t h i s  t y p e  
p l a y e d  i n  t h e  p l a n e .  
In o r d e r  t o  bound t h e  s ta te -space ,  a r e f l e c t i n F  ba r r i e r  was 
imposed a t  r = 1 0 ,  so  on ly  t h e  r e g i o n  r<10 - was c o n s i d e r e d .  I n  ad- 
d i t i o n ,  b y  problem symmet ry ,  on ly  t h e  r e g i o n  o < e < 1 8 o 0  - -. was i n v e s t i -  
gated,  and a r e f l e c t i n p  ba r r i e r  was a l s o  s e t  a l o n p  t h e  y - a x i s .  
Thus 
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A 20° discretization of the angular coordinate (A6) was 
chosen along with a 1 unit radial discretization .(Ar). Thus, 
there was a total of 81 state blocks  plus  the capture circle 
( R = S O )  that comprised the  (compactified)  state-space x. The 
state-space decomposition, along with our particular ordering 
of the  blocks  is shown in Fig. 3. 
The next step in our analysis was the specification of the 
sets of "canonical maneuvers.'' For the pursuer we chose minimum 
radius left  and right turns  and  a  straight  ahead ash; s o ,  
u=-l,+l,O, respectively. (Intermediate  maneuvers, e.g., a 2R turn, 
could  be  included  if  desired.) The evader, on the  other hand, can 
change his direction instantaneously. Thus, he chooses the angle 
v  between  velocity  vectors  w1  and w2.  We constructed  a finite 
set of evader controls by restricting v(t) to take  only  the  values 
n7r/4, n=1,3,5,7. Hence E has a total of four different "maneuvers" 
from which to choose his  control. 
Given  the  state-space  decomposition  and  the particular choice 
of control sets, the transition probabilities p (u,v)  were  com- 
puted for all 81 blocks Si for each of the 12 different  pairs  of 
control strategies. A total of 36 points  were  uniformly  distributed 
ij 
over each  block Si. For a given strategy pair (u,v) the equations 
of motion (4.1) were integrated  starting  from  each initial point. t 
The integrations were stopped when the resulting trajectory  left 
si or met  a reflecting barrier.  The fraction of points  that  en- 
tered S was taken as p (u,v). Since transitions are  allowed 
only  to adjacent blocks, a  maximum of 9 nonzero numbers need be 
computed and stored for each  block Si. 
j 13 
I We chose Amin = 'max = 4.0. 
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FIG.3 STATE-SPACE  DECOMPOSIT ION  AND  ORDERING  FOR 
H O M r C I D A L  CHAUFFEUR  PROBLEM 
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F o r  s i m p l i c i t y  a n d  c o m p u t a t i o n a l  ease, t h e  q u a n t i t i e s  
( u , v )  were a l l  set  e q u a l  t o  1. Thus, t h e  p a y o f f   f o r  t h e  
Markov game i s  t h e  "number o f  b l o c k  t r a n s i t i o n s  t o  c a p t u r e , "  as 
c o n t r a s t e d  w i t h  t h e  "time t o  c a p t u r e "  p a y o f f  o f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  
Homicidal  Chauffeur  problem. 
c i J  
Computa t iona l  Solu t ion- -Having  formula ted  a w e l l - d e f i n e d  
d i scre te  Markov game i n  terms o f  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  
p i J  a n d  c o s t s  c t he  computa t iona l  a lgo r i thm o f  Theorem 2 was i j  ' 
a p p l i e d .  We sough t  t h e  m a j o r a n t   p o l i c y  pa i r  ( i . e . ,  min-max s o l u -  
t i o n )  s i n c e  w e  d i d  n o t  a p r i o r i  v e r i f y  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a saddle- 
p o i n t .  The a l g o r i t h m   c o n v e r e e d   m o n o t o n i c a l l y   t o  V * ,  (ni,nt) i n  
abou t  60 i t e r a t i o n s ,  s t a r t i n g  a t  V o ( i )  = 0 f o r  a l l  i .  
The r e s u l t a n t   d i s c r e t e   s o l u t i o n  i s  shown i n  F i g .  4 .  The 
number w i t h i n  each b l o c k  i s  t h e  o p t i m a l   c o s t   V * ( i ) .   F o r   b l o c k s  
i n  t h e  r e g i o n  e n c l o s e d  by t h e  s o l i d  c u r v e  i t  is o p t i m a l  f o r  t h e  
p u r s u e r   t o   t u r n  away ( u = - 1 )   o r  f l e e  (u=O)  from t h e  e v a d e r .  Else- 
where P t u r n s  i n t o  E ( u = + l ) .   S i m i l a r   r e s u l t s   h o l d  by symmet ry  f o r  
18o0<8<36o0.  - Note tha t  t h i s  s t r a t e g y  w i l l  c ause  t h e  r e s u l t a n t  
s t a t e  t r a j e c t o r y  t o  " c h a t t e r "  b a c k  and  f o r t h  a c r o s s  t h e  y - a x i s  
p r i o r  t o  c a p t u r e .  T h i s  i s  a r e s u l t   o f  t h e  pu r sue r ' s   knowine  E ' s  
p o s i t i o n  o n l y  t o  w i t h i n  a b l o c k ;  h e n c e ,  t h e  d i s a p p e a r a n c e  o f  t h e  
" u n i v e r s a l  l i n e ' ' .  
A compar ison  of  t h e  d i s c r e t e  s o l u t i o n  w i t h  t h a t  o f  t h e  c o r -  
r e s p o n d i n c   c o n t i n u o u s  game i s  a l s o   f o u n d   i n   F i e .  4 .  T h i s  compari- 
s o n  i s  somewhat  tenuous  because  of t h e  two d i f f e r e n t  c o s t  f u n c -  
t i o n a l s  u s e d ,  i . e . ,  time t o  c a p t u r e  v s .  b l o c k  t r a n s i t i o n s  t o  c a p -  
t u r e .  More i m p o r t a n t l y ,   h o w e v e r ,  we h a v e   n o t   a t t e m p t e d   t o   a p p r o x -  
imate the c o n t i n u o u s  game s o l u t i o n .  We have  posed L" and   so lved  a 
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more   mean ingfu l   desc r ip t ion  of a p h y s i c a l  s i t u a t i o n -  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  
there are some c o n c l u s i o n s  t o  be drawn from such 8 d i s c r e t e - c o n -  
t i nuous   compar i son .  
F i r s t ,  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  the d i s c r e t i z e d  u=-l,O r e g i o n  w i t h i n  
the c o r r e s p o n d i n g  r e g i o n  (dashed c u r v e )  f o r  t h e  c o n t i n u o u s  game 
c a n  b e  e x p l a i n e d  largely on t h e  basis o f  t h e  degradation o f  P and 
E ' s  p o s i t i o n  estimates. P ' S  l a c k  of p e r f e c t  position i n f o r m a t i o n  
c a u s e s  him t o  a d o p t  a m o r e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  s t r a t e g y  to a v o l d  the 
h e a v y  p e n a l t i e s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  m a k i n g  a n  i n c o r r e c t  d e c i s i o n .  
For   example,  i f  E I s  l o c a t e d  " a b o v e "  t h e  dashed   curve  P s h o u l d  
d e f i n i t e l y  t u r n  hard r i g h t ,  o r  e l s e  t h e  e v a d e r  could b e  d r i v e n  
i n t o  a r e g i o n   o f   v e r y  h i p h  c o s t .  On t h e  o the r   hand  i f  E i s  "below" 
t h i s  c u r v e ,  t he  s t a t e  i s  a l ready  i n  a r e g i o n  o f  h i g h  c o s t  a n d  t h e  
r e s u l t i n g  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  u = - 1  o r  +1 i s  rot so pronounced.  
S i n c e  t h e  p u r s u e r  c a n n o t  d i s t i n g u i s h  w i t h  c e r t a i n t y  o n  w h i c h  s ide  
o f  t he  cu rve  E l i e s ,  t h e  more c o n s e r v a t i v e  s t ra tegy  i s  t o  a p p l y  
u = + l  i n  t h i s  v i c i n i t y .  T h i s  i s  e n t i r e l y   c o n s i s t e n t  with "minimax" 
no t ions   and  i s  a most i n t e r e s t i n g  phenomena. 
The evader  on  t h e  o ther  hand  does  not  have  a p r e c i s e  estimate 
o f  P I S  p o s i t i o n .  T h i s  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  E ' s  n o t   b e i n g  ab le  t o  d i r e c t  
h i s  v e l o c i t y   p r e c i s e l y  away from P .  T h e r e f o r e ,  there  a r i ses  some 
p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  if u=+l ,E  cou ld  be d r i v e n  u n w i t t i n g l y  a c r o s s  t h e  
dashed c u r v e  i n t o  a r e g i o n  o f  low c o s t ,  i . e . ,  t h e  "barr ier"  has 
become f fporous l l .   Thus  P c a n  c a p i t a l i z e  o n  e v a d e r  , e r r o r  i n  t h i s  
r e g i o n  by app ly ing  u=+l  and  the re  r e s u l t s  a n  a d d i t t o n a l  " l o w e r i n p "  
o f  t h e  s t r a t egy  barr ier .  
There i s  a s e c o n d  i n t e r e s t i n p  c o m p a r i s o n  t o  b e  f o u n d  i n  
F i g .  4 .  I n  the c o n t i n u o u s  game 
c o n t i n u o u s  a c r o s s  t h e  ba r r i e r .  
, t h e  o p t i m a l  c o s t  i s  s h a r p l y  d i s -  
Shown w i t h i n  e a c h  b l o c k  of F i ~ . 4  
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i s  t h e  o p t i m a l  c o s t  ( a v e r a g e  number o f  stages t o  c a p t u r e )  f o r  t h e  
discrete  game. No t i ce  how V*(i) s t r o n g l y   v a r i e s   i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y  
o f  t h e  dashed c u r v e .  It t h e r e f o r e   a p p e a r s  t h a t  there  i s  a " d i s -  
c re t e ,  s m o o t h e d   d i s c o n t i n u i t y ' '   i n  t h i s  r e g i o n .  T h i s  phenomena 
c a n  be  i l l u s t r a t e d  f u r t h e r  by p l o t t i n g  the b l o c k  c o s t  a l o n g  a 
rad ia l  s e g m e n t   f o r   f i x e d  6 .  F i g u r e  5 shows three  o f  these  s tep-  
wise c o s t   p r o f i l e s .  Also shown, f o r  t h e  g i v e n  8 s l i c e  i s  t h e  
radial  rep ion   th rough  which  t h e  c o n t i n u o u s  bar r ie r  passes. No t i ce  
tha t  i n  a l l  c a s e s  t h e  c o n t i n u o u s  ba r r i e r  passes th rough  a r e p i o n  
i n  t h e  s t a t e  space where t h e  d i s c r e t e  c o s t  has decreased s h a r p l y  
f rom  b lock  t o  b lock   and  has r e a c h e d  a minimum.  From t h i s  p o i n t  
on ,  t h e  c o s t  i n c r e a s e s  w i t h  r i n  a seeminply  smoother   manner .  
The  above  demons t r a t e s  t h a t  i t  may b e  p o s s i b l e  t o  d e l i n e a t e  
t h e  r e g i o n  i n  t h e  s t a t e - space  th rough  which  t h e  c o n t i n u o u s  c o s t  
bar r ie r  passes. Needless t o  s a y  t h i s w o u l d   g i v e   o n l y  a c r u d e  ap- 
p r o x i m a t i o n  i n  v i e w  o f  o u r  g e n e r a l l y  c r u d e  d e c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  
s t a t e  space .  A f i n e r   d e c o m p o s i t i o n   c o u l d   c o n c e i v a b l y   g i v e  a 
b e t t e r  approx ima t ion .   Thus ,   a l t hough   ou r   app roach  does n o t   i n -  
v o l v e  t h e  a p p r o x i r a t i o n  o f  c o n t i n u o u s  s o l u t i o n s ,  i t  appears t h a t  
o u r  m e t h o d  d o e s  p r o v i d e  i n s i g h t  i n t o  some i m p o r t a n t  c h a r a c t e r i s -  
t i c s  of t h e  c o n t i n u o u s  game. 
Two Car Problem 
Perhaps  t h e  most   obvious   ex tens ion   of  the  Homicidal  Cha .uf f el a r  
Problem i s  t h e  s i t u a t i o n   i n  which "" bo th  p l a y e r s  h a v e   f i n i t e   m i n i -  
mum t u r n i n g  rad i i .  T h i s  i s  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  "TWO Car Problem"  and 
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The e q u a t i o n s  o f  m o t i o n  f o r  t h i s  p r o b l e m  ( w r i t t e n  w i t h  r e s p e c t  
t o  a p u r s u e r - c e n t e r e d  s y s t e m  o f  c o o r d i n a t e s )  are similar t o  ( 4 . 1 )  
and are g i v e n  by 
W 1 x = -- 
R1 
y u + w 2  s i n  JI 
W 
j , r -  
R1 
l x u - w  1 + w 2 c o s J I  ( 4 . 4 )  
where JI i s  t h e  ang le   be tween  E and P I S  v e l o c i t y  v e c t o r s .  R1,u 
and  R2,v a re ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  P and E ' s  minimum t u r n i n g  r a d i u s  a n d  
r a t e  o f  t u r n .  
Thus, the two-car game i s  p l ayed  i n  t h e  t h r e e  d imens iona l  
(x,y,$) s t a t e  space and t h e  g e o m e t r i c  c o n s t r u c t i o n s  t h a t  one   uses  
i n   t w o - s t a t e   p r o b l e m s  become rather  awkward t o  a p p l y  here .  There- 
f o r e ,  i t  is  n o t   s u r p r i s i n p  t h a t  l i t t l e  i s  known r e g a r d i n g  t h e  
a n a l y t i c   s o l u t i o n   t o  t h e  t w o   c a r   p r o b l e m .   I s s a c s '  (Ref.3) g i v e s  
t h e  BUP (Boundary  of Useable Par t )  a n d  p o r t i o n s  of  t h e  semi- 
permeable s u r f a c e  (ba r r i e r )  emanat inq  f rom the  BUP. Miller 
(Ref.31) has n u m e r i c a l l y  o b t a i n e d  a f a m i l y  o f  cu rves  t h a t  F i v e  
parameter v a l u e s  f o r  w h i c h  t h e  e n t i r e  s p a c e  i s  c a p t u r a b l e  ( i . e . ,  
f o r  which t h e  e v a d e r   c a n n o t   e s c a p e ) .  The re  i s  l i t t l e  i n  t h e  
l i t e r a t u r e  beyond these  r e s u l t s .  
We began  ou r  s tudy  o f  t h e  two-car problem by choos ing  a s e t  
o f  parameter v a l u e s  f o r  which c a p t u r e  was a s s u r e d  f o r  a l l  s t a t e s .  
The cu rves .  g iven  in  Ref .31  were used  as a g u i d e ;  t h e  parameters 
chosen were 
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w = 1 .0  , w2 = . 8  , R1 = 1.5 , R2 = .5 , L = 1.0 1 
C o m p u t a t i o n a l  S o l u t i o n  t o  Two-Car Problem 
As i n  t h e  Homicidal  Chauffeur  Problem, we began  our  re formu-  
l a t i o n  o f  t h e  two-car  problem by choos ing  a m e a n i n g f u l  s t a t e - s p a c e  
decomposi t ion .   Decomposi t ion  of t h e  x-y p l a n e  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  
r - 8   p o l a r   c o o r d i n a t e s  was a g a i n   c h o s e n .  T h i s  time t h e  6 c o o r d i n a t e  
was d i s c r e t i z e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  c l o c k  p o s i t i o n s  ( i . e . ,  eve ry  30"). 
T h u s ,   a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  c l o c k   p o s i t i o n  j ( l < j < 1 2 )  " we have t h e  a n g u l a r  
s e c t o r  
i . e . ,  a g i v e n  s t a t e  b l o c k  s u b t e n d s  a n  a n g l e  o f  3 0 ° ,  c e n t e r e d  a t  
a c l o c k  p o s i t i o n .  t 
The rad ia l  c o o r d i n a t e  r was d i s c r e t i z e d  i n  1 u n i t  i n t e r v a l s  
as b e f o r e .  A r e f l e c t i n g  b a r r i e r  was p l a c e d  a t  r = 1 0  t o  bound t h e  
s t a t e  space. 
The J ,  c o o r d i n a t e  was d i s c r e t i z e d  i n  a manner t h a t  was moti-  
v a t e d  by  human e s t i m a t i o n  c a p a b i l i t i e s .  A p r e c i s e   e s t i m a t i o n  o f  
r e l a t i v e  v e l o c i t y  d i r e c t i o n  i s  g e n e r a l l y  q u i t e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  o b t a i n  
v i s u a l l y .   A c c o r d i n g l y ,  t h e  J ,  c o o r d i n a t e  was decomposed i n t o   o n l y  
fou r   s egmen t s  : 
I I n  t h e  Homicidal  Chauffeur  Problem there  is a u n i v e r s a l  l i n e  a n d  
a dispersal  l i n e  a t  t h e  1 2  and 6 o ' c l o c k  p o s i t i o n s  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
We c e n t e r e d  o u r  b l o c k s  a t  c l o c k  p o s i t i o n s  i n  o r d e r  t o  see whether  
t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a u n i v e r s a l / d i s p e r s a l  c u r v e  would b e  r e f l e c t e d  
i n  s u i t a b l e  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  d i s c r e t e  s o l u t i o n .  
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45' 9 - < 135O: E moving  from " lef t  t o  r i g h t "  r e l a t i v e  t o  P 
135O < $J - < 225O: E and P moving i n   " o p p o s i t e "   d i r e c t i o n s  
225O < 9 - < 315O: E moving from " r i g h t  t o  l e f t "  r e l a t i v e  t o  P 
- 4 5 O  - 45O : E and P moving i n  t h e  "same" d i r e c t i o n  
Thus,  t h e  state-space - was decomposed i n t o  9 - 1 2 - 4  = 432 
b l o c k s  Si p l u s  t h e  c a p t u r e  r e g i o n  
We f e l t  t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t a n t  r-e-JI decompos i t ion  was a r e a s o n a b l e  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  sets a v a i l a b l e  i n  a n  a c t u a l  
encounter  between two manned v e h i c l e s .  
Fo r  t h e  se t s  of  canonica l  maneuvers  we chose  only  t h e  ex t reme 
c a s e s   o f :  ( a )  h a r d  t u r n  r i g h t ,  ( b )  hard  t u r n  l e f t ,  and ( c )  s t r a igh t  
dash. Thus ,   pu r sue r   and   evade r  each had a t o t a l  o f  th ree  c o n t r o l  
m a n e u v e r s ,  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by u , v  = -1,+1,0 r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
Having  decomposed t h e  s ta te  space i n  a meaninFfu1  manner  and 
h a v i n g  a s s i g n e d  t h e  sets of canonica l  maneuvers ,  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  P ( U , V >  were computed f o r  a l l  i , j  and pa i r s  ( u , ~ ) .  t iJ 
'A t o t a l  o f  27 p o i n t s  p e r  b l o c k  was used ( th ree  p o i n t s  a l o n g  each 
d imens ion)  w i t h  A m i n = . l ,  Amax t 2 . 0 .  Each   po in t  was e q u i d i s t a n t  
f r o m  a n y  a d j a c e n t  p o i n t .  
52 
S i n c e  t r a n s i t i o n s  were a l l o w e d  o n l y  t o  a d j a c e n t  b l o c k s ,  there  
was a maximum of  27  non-zero  numbers p a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a g i v e n  
i. The r e s u l t a n t   t o t a l   o f   4 3 2 - 2 7 . 9  = l o 5  numbers was e f f i c i e n t l y  
s t o r e d  o n  a r ap id -access  compute r  f i l e .  
i j  
t 
Once a g a i n ,   f o r   s i m p l i c i t y ,   t h e  rewards c ( u , v >  were a l l  1 3  
set e q u a l   t o   u n i t y .   T h u s ,  t h e  o r i g i n a l   c o s t   o f  "time t o   c a p t u r e "  
was r e p l a c e d  by "stages t o  c a p t u r e " .  
The r e s u l t a n t  d i sc re t e  Markov game that  we f o r m u l a t e d  was 
s o l v e d   u s i n g  t h e  a l g o r i t h m  o f  Theorem 2 .  Only t h e  min-max 
s o l u t i o n  was o b t a i n e d   f o r  TT:, IT:, V * ( i ) .  The computed  pursuer  
s t ra tegy  i s  shown i n   F i g .  6 .  It appears t h a t  P's s t r a t e g y  i s  
b a s i c a l l y  t o  t u r n  i n t o  E ,  a l t h o u g h  there  are  a few b l o c k s  where 
t h i s  i s  n o t  tile c a s e .   I n   p a r t i c u l a r   n o t e  tha t  ( e x c e p t   f o r  a few 
b l o c k s )  t h e  p u r s u e r ' s  o p t i m a l  s t r a t e g y  f o r  b l o c k s  c e n t e r e d  a t  
t h e  1 2  o ' c l o c k   p o s i t i o n  i s  u = 0 ( i . e .  s t ra ight  d a s h ) .  To t h e  
l e f t  o f  1 2  o 'c l .ock  u = -1 i s  o p t i m a l  w h i l e  u = +1 i s  o p t i m a l  when 
E i s  l o c a t e d  t o  t h e  r i g h t .  T h u s  t r a j e c t o r i e s   t e n d   t o   c o n v e r g e  
i n t o  t h e  forward  u = 0 reg1c.r. which  can be  c a l l e d  a "" u n i v e r s a l   z o n e  
( c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  a similar phenomenon i n  t h e  c o n t i n u o u s  c a s e ) .  
A l s o  n o t e  i n  F i g .  6 t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a r e g i o n  a t  t h e  6 o ' c l o c k  
p o s i t i o n  where t h e  p u r s u e r  c a n  a p p l y  u = +1 w i t h  e q u a l  r e s u l t a n t  
c o s t .  T h i s  i s  e x p e c t e d  by problem symmetry and i s  r e m i n i s c e n t  
of the  phenomena a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  dispersal  c u r v e s  i n  c o n t i n u o u s  
games. Hence, t h i s  r e g i o n  may b e  regarded as a dispersal  zone. 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  a t h o r o u g h  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  these r e s u l t s  
r e q u i r e s  a n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  how t h e  r e s u l t i n g  s t a t e  t r a j e c t o r y  
'A convent iona l  dynamic  programming formula t ion  of  t h e  Markov 
game would   requi re   (43212 9 = 1.7 x lo6 s u c h  t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b -  
a b i l i t i e s .  
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c)225O+s 3 1 5 O  
F I G . 6   P U R S U E R S   O P T I M A L   D I S C R E T E   F E E D B A C K   S T R A T € G Y , T W O   C A R  
P R O B L E M :  w l , = l . O ,  ~ 2 a . 8 ,  R l = 1 . 5 ,   R 2 = . 5 ,  Ls1 
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e v o l v e s   i n  the three d imens iona l  (P,O,$) space. Because t h e  game 
i s  not  symmetr ic  w i t h  respect t o  t h e  p l a n e  y = 0 ( r e c a l l  t ha t  
there was symmetry w i t h  respect t o  y = 0 i n  t h e  Homicidal  Chauf- 
f e u r   p r o b l e m )  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  s ta te  e v o l u t i o n  may be  complex. A 
s t u d y  o f  t h i s  t y p e  has been  l e f t  f o r  f u r t h e r  research. 
The o p t i m a l  c o s t s  V* f o r  t he  432 b l o c k s  are p r e s e n t e d  i n  
Table  2. The b l o c k s  are indexed  by t h e  t r i p l e  ( i , j  ,k) 1 S i S 9, 
1s j s  1 2 ,  11 k s  4.  Thus block S i n c l u d e s  t h e  r e g i o n  
a B Y  
N o t i c e  t h a t  t h e  smailest c o s t  o c c u r s  f o r  b l o c k  S1,12,2 i. e.  where 
t h e  e v a d e r  i s  d i r e c t l y  i n  f r o n t  o f  P and on a c o 1 l i s i o . n  c o u r s e .  
N o t i c e  a l s o  t h a t  t he re  i s  a symmetry here ,  namely t h e  c o s t s  a re  
e q u a l  f o r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  b l o c k s .  
S - s  
i j  2 i , 1 2 - j  , 2  
' i j 4  - ' i , 1 2 - j , 4  
sij 1 %2-j , 3  
5 
i f o r  a l l  1 , j  
T h i s  symmetry i s  e n t i r e l y  e x p e c t e d  f r o m  p h y s i c a l  r e a s o n i n g .  
I n  t h e  s t u d y  of  t h e  Homicidal  Chauffeur  problem we saw t h a t  
t h e  c o n t i n u o u s  c o s t  barr ier  was l o c a t e d  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  i n  a r e g i o n  
o f  t h e  state-space where the  d i s c r e t e  c o s t  was a t  a " v a l l e y " .  
T h i s  f a c t ,  coupled  w i t h  t h e  data i n  T a b l e  2 ,  s u g g e s t  tha t  i t  may 
be p o s s i b l e  t o  demarcate a r e g i o n  i n  t h e  state-space t h r o u g h  
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TABLE 2 
Optimal  Costs f o r  the  Two-Car Markov Game 
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I 
c o s t  p r o f i l e s  (as w e  d i d  i n  Fig.  5 )  a n d  n o t i n g  t h e  r e g i o n s  o f  
r ap id  cos t   change .  The r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  are shown i n  
Fig.  7. U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  there  d o e s   n o t   p r e s e n t l y   e x i s t   a n   a n a l y t i c  
s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  cont inuous  two-car  problem w i t h  which t o  compare 
o u r  r e s u l t .  A par t ia l  d e s c r i p t i o n  of  t h e  barrier i s  g i v e n  i n  
Issacs (Ref. 3)  and bears some similari ty i n  shape t o  t h e  shaded 
r e g i o n  o f  F ig .  7. Any f u r t h e r   c o m p a r i s o n s  a t  t h i s  po in t   would  
r e q u i r e  m o r e  a n a l y t i c  research. 
Summary 
We have  seen  how o u r  c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n  o f  manned games of con- 
f l i c t  c a n  be used  t o  s o l v e  e x i s t i n g  p rob lems .  The r e s u l t s  o f  s o l v i n g  
t h e  Homicidal Chauffeur  problem show tha t  our  approach  and  tech-  
n i q u e  are b a s i c a l l y   s o u n d .  The a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  a th ree  d imens iona l  
p r o b l e m  i n d i c a t e s  some of  t h e  f u t u r e  p o t e n t i a l  a n d  u s e f u l n e s s  o f  
t h e  method. 
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a) 45" < $ I 135O 
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58 
 FIG.^ ( C O N T I N U E D )  
59 

5. THE DOGFIGHT PROBLEM 
Thus far ,  w e  have  been  conce rned  p r imar i ly  w i t h  p u r s u i t -  
e v a s i o n  games. These games are i m p o r t a n t  i n  t h e  s t u d y   o f  ae r ia l  
combat b u t  t h e y  r e p r e s e n t  a s i m p l i f i c a t i o n  o f  r e a l i s t i c  ae r ia l  
d u e l s ,   o r   " d o g f i g h t s " .   I n  t h i s  chapter ,  w e  c o n s i d e r  t h e  "dog- 
f i g h t "  problem. We b e g i n  w i t h  a g e n e r a l  d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  problem 
a n d   d e v e l o p   p o s s i b l e   a p p r o a c h e s   t o  i t .  Then, w e  examine a "s imple"  
example i n  o r d e r  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  ideas i n v o l v e d  a n d  t o  i n d i c a t e  
t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n h e r e n t  i n  t h e  problem. 
Some G e n e r a l  C o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
I n  a p u r s u i t - e v a s i o n  game,   one  player  ( t h e  p u r s u e r )  attempts 
t o  d e s t r o y  o r  c a p t u r e  h i s  opponent ( t h e  evader)   whose  Foal  i s  t o  
a v o i d  t h i s  outcome. The  s i t u a t i o n  i n  a r e a l i s t i c  a e r i a l  d u e l ,  o r  
" d o g f i g h t " ,  i s  more c o m p l i c a t e d  i n  tha t  e a c h  p a r t i c i p a n t  w i s h e s  
t o  d e s t r o y  h i s  opponent   and  each wishes t o  a v o i d  e x t e r m i n a t i o n .  
None the le s s ,  it i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  f o r m u l a t e  a d i f f e r e n t i a l  pame tha t  
embodies t h e  e s s e n t i a l   e l e m e n t s   o f  a d o g f i g h t .  L e t  u s  s e e  how t h i s  
might b e  done. 
There are f o u r  p o s s i - b l e  o u t c o m e s  i n  a dogf ight  be tween two 
v e h i c l e s  ( s a y ,  A and B ) .  These  a r e :  ( i )  A d e s t r o y s  B ;  ( ii) B 
d e s t r o y s  A :  (iii) A and B a re  d e s t r o y e d ;  a n d  ( i v )  n e i t h e r  A n o r  E 
i s  d e s t r o y e d .  With each  of these  "outcomes" w e  c a n   a s s o c i a t e  a 
t e r m i n a t i o n   c r i t e r i o n   f o r  t h e  game. For  example ,  c o n s i d e r  t h e  
t w o   v e h i c l e s  as p o i n t  masses moving i n  a p l a n e .  L e t  e a c h   v e h i c l e  
have a r e g i o n  R ( .  ( o f ,  s a y ,  weapons e f f e c t i v e n e s s )   a t t a c h e d   t o  
i t ;  t h e  o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e g i o n  may depend  on t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  
t h e  v e l o c i t y  v e c t o r  of t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n p  v e h i c l e ,  e . g . ,  as i l l u s -  
t r a t ed  i n  F i p u r e  8 .  Suppose t h a t  a v e h i c l e  i s  d e s t r o y e d  t h e  
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moment i t  e n t e r s  t he  r e g i o n  o f  w e a p o n s  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  his 
opponent .   Then,  the t e r m i n a t i o n   c r i t e r i o n   c o r r e s p o n d i n g   t o   o u t -  
come (i) is t h a t  B e n t e r   r e g i o n  R A ( B € R A ) .  S i m i l a r l y ,   o u t c o m e s  
(ii) and (iii) are c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by ( A E R ~ )  and (BER and A a R B ) ,  
r e s p e c t i v e l y .   F i n a l l y ,  the fou r th   ou tcome  i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by 
c o n d i t i o n s  t ha t  A n e v e r  e n t e r s  RB and B n e v e r  e n t e r s  RA f o r  t h e  
d u r a t i o n  o f  t h e  game. 
A 
More g e n e r a l l y ,  l e t  - x deno te  t h e  s t a t e  o f  t h e  game (it e v o l v e s  
a c c o r d i n p  t o  some p r e s c r i b e d  d i f f e r e n t i a l  e q u a t i o n )  a n d  l e t  $, and 
$, b e  t h e  se t s  o f  s t a t e s  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  o u t c o m e s  1 and 2 ,  respec- 
t i v e l y .  Then t h e  four   "outcomes"   o f  t h e  pane are  d e s c r i b e d  by t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  t e r m i n a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  
* 
1. - x E $ - ( A  d e s t r o y s  B )  A' 
2. - x E JIB: ( B  d e s t r o y s  P.) 
3. - X E $An $, = QAB: (Both A and B d e s t r o y e d )  
4 .  - x E qAu @, = qD : (Nei ther  A o r  B d e s t r o y e d ) .  
The game t e r m i n a t e s  t h e  f i rs t  time - x e n t e r s  e i t h e r  qA,  9, o r  q A B .  
If i t  n e v e r  e n t e r s  a n y  o f  these se t s  ( i . e . ,  X E Q ~ )  d u r i n g  t h e  en- 
t i r e  p l a y  of  t he  game, we have a "draw." 
* 
$, JIB and Q A  u JIB d e n o t e  t he  i n t e r s e c t i o n   a n d   u n i o n  of $, and 
r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  a n d  t h e  rrbarr l  i n d i c a t e s  t h e  complement  of t h e  
"barred" set .  Thus,  &E$* n $B means t h a t  - x i s  i n  b o t h  $A and $, 
and ZE$*U JIB means t h a t  - x i s  n o t   i n  $A o r  9,. 
$B 
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Clearly, f o r  p l a y e r  A ,  outcome 1 is m o s t  p r e f e r a b l e  a n d  o u t -  
come 2 l eas t  p r e f e r a b l e .  The p r e f e r e n c e   o r d e r i n g   o f   o u t c o m e s  3 
and 4 i s  not   obvious .   Undoubtedly ,   mos t   p i lo t s   would  prefer t h e  
f o u r t h  o u t c o m e  b u t  o n e  c a n  e a s i l y  e n v i s i o n  s i t u a t i o n s  i n  which 
t h e  t h i r d  outcome i s  preferable f r o m  a n  o v e r a l l  s t r a t e g i c  p o i n t  
o f   v i e w .   F o r   i l l u s t r a t i v e   p u r p o s e s  l e t  us  assume tha t  p l a y e r  A 
p r e f e r s  m u t u a l  d e s t r u c t i o n  t o  m u t u a l  e s c a p e  a n d  tha t  p l a y e r  B has 
t h e  same p re fe rence .   Then ,  t h e  dogf igh t   p rob lem  can  b e  f o r m u l a t e d  
as a nonzero  sum game w i t h ,  f o r  example, t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t e r m i n a l  
p a y o f f  f u n c t i o n s  
JA = 0 
J A  = 3 
JA = 1 
JA = 2 
JB = 0 
JB = 1 
JB = 2 
I n  t h i s  c a s e  p l a y e r s  A and B a t tempt  t o  minimize JA and JB, respec- 
t i v e l y .   N o t i c e  tha t  if there  is a " d u e l  t o  t h e  death" ( e l i r n i n a t i n p  
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  o u t c o m e  4 )  o r  i f  B and A o rder  ou tcomes  3 and 
4 d s f f e r e n t l y ,  o r  i f  t h e y  c o n s i d e r  them e q u i v a l e n t ,  t h e n  a ze ro -  
sum game may b e  f o r m u l a t e d .  
It  is t h e o r e t i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e  t o  s o l v e  a game of  t h e  t y p e  j u s t  
descr ibed .  I n   p r a c t i c e ,   h o w e v e r ,  t h e  s o l u t i o n   w o u l d  be  most d i f -  
f i c u l t  t o  o b t a i n  e x c e p t ,  perhaps ,  i n  t h e  s implest  of c a s e s .  More- 
o v e r ,  t he  a s s i g n m e n t  o f  n u m e r i c a l  p a y o f f s  is c lea r ly  a rb i t r a ry .  
What i s  o f  prime impor t ance  here i s  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  which 
outcome w i l l  o c c u r ;  i n d e e d ,  t h e  dogf ight   p roblem i s  r ea l ly  a com- 
p l i c a t e d  "game o f   k i n d . "  T h i s  f a c t ,   a l o n g  w i t h  o t h e r   c o n s i d -  
e r a t i o n s  t o  be d i s c d s s e d  b e l o w ,  s u g g e s t s  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  a p p r o a c h  
t o  t h e  dogf igh t  p rob lem.  
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I n  a p u r s u i t - e v a s i o n  game t h e  r o l e s  o f  t h e  p l a y e r s  are f i x e d  
th roughou t  t h e  p l a y   o f  t h e  game: o n e   p l a y e r  i's a p u r s u e r ,  t h e  
o t h e r   a n   e v a d e r .  T h i s  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  t h e  case i n  a d o g f i g h t .  
I n  f a c t ,  o n e  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  d o g f i g h t  i s  t h a t  t h e  
p l a y e r s  may c h a n g e  r o l e s  s e v e r a l  times d u r i n p  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  t h e  
engagement .   Consequent ly ,   one   can   th ink   of  t h e  dogf igh t   p rob lem 
as be ing  compr ised  of  t h e  fo l lowing  two parts:  
a .  G i v e n   c e r t a i n   i n f o r m a t i o n   r e g a r d i n g  t h e  s t a t e s  of  t h e  two 
v e h i c l e s ,  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  r o l e s  t o  b e  assumed by  e a c h  v e h i c l e .  
Does A c h a s e  B o r  v i c e - v e r s a ?  
b .  Given t h e  r o l e s   o f  t h e  two v e h i c l e s ,   d e t e r m i n e  t h e  a s s o c i . a t e d  
o p t i m a l  s t ra teg ies  o r  gu idance   l aws .  
The second  problem i s  j u s t  t h e  pu r su i t - evas ion   p rob lem.  The 
f i r s t  problem,  which we c a l l  t h e  "role s e l e c t i o n "   p r o b l e m ,  i s  t h e  
u n i q u e  a n d  c r u c i a l  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  doRf ight   p roblem;  w e  w i l l  be  
concerned  p r i m a r i l y  w i t h  t h i s  p r o b l e m  i n  t h e  r ema inde r  o f  t h i s  
c h a p t e r .  
C o n c e p t u a l l y ,  t h e  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  two i n t e r r e l a t e d  p r o b l e m s  
may be  v i s u a l i z e d  as f o l l o w s .  The b a s i c   p r o b l e m  i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  
by t h e  t e r m i n a t i o n   c r i t e r i a  embodied i n  ( 1 ) - ( 4 )  a b o v e .   I n   p r i n c -  
i p l e ,  once t h e  i n i t i a l  s t a t e  o f  t h e  problen! i s  g i v e n ,  - t h e  -- - outcome - - "
"" i s  a l s o  known, assuming  op t imal  p l a y  by bo th  s ides .  Thus,  one 
c a n  c o n s i d e r  t h e  s t a t e  s p a c e  b e i n g  d i v i d e d  ( i n  p r i n c i p l e )  i n t o  
f o u r   d i s t i n c t   r e g i o n s :  W A  ( w i n   f o r  A ) ,  WB ( w i n   f o r  B ) ,  W A B  
( m u t u a l   d e s t r u c t i o n ) ,   a n d  WD (d raw) .  If p l a y  s t a r t s  i n  W A  and A 
p l a y s  o p t i m a l l y ,  t h e n  t h e  s t a t e  remains i n  WA for the  d u r a t i o n  o f  
t h e  game ( a n d  t e r m i n a t e s  i n  JI, which i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  c o n t a i n e d  i n  
W A ) .  A similar s t a t e m e n t  may be  made w i t h  r e s p e c t   t o  W B .  I n  t h e  
65  
other  t w o  r e g i o n s ,  WAB and WD, b o t h  p l a y e r s  m u s t  p l a y  o p t i m a l l y  
i n  o r d e r  f o r  t h e  s ta te  t o  r e m a i n  i n  t h e  g i v e n  r e g i o n .  If one 
p l a y e r  d o e s  n o t  u s e  h i s  o p t i m a l  s t r a t e g y  i n  e i t he r  of these re- 
g i o n s ,  the s ta te  can  move t o  a r e g i o n  that  i s  more f a v o r a b l e  t o  
h i s  opponent .  The d e s c r i p t i o n  here i s  r e m i n i s c e n t   o f  t h e  s i t u a -  
t i o n  i n  t h e  p u r s u i t - e v a s i o n  game o f  k i n d .  I n  f a c t ,  t h e  b o u n d a r i e s  
between the  v a r i o u s   r e g i o n s  ( W A , . , . , W D )  c o n s t i t u t e  "barriers" i n  
t h e  u s u a l  Isaacs '  s e n s e  (Ref .3) ,  i . e . ,  t h e y  are n o t  c r o s s e d  i n  
o p t i m a l  p l a y .  
The method f o r  s e l e c t i n g  a p l a y e r ' s  r o l e  i s  now o b v i o u s ,  a t  
l eas t  i n  r e g i o n s  WA and WB. If - X E W ~ ,  A i s  t h e  p u r s u e r ,  B t h e  
e v a d e r  a n d  v i c e  v e r s a  i f  - X E W ~ .  Moreover ,  fo r  p l a y  i n  one of  these 
r e g i o n s  a payof f  such  as time t o  c a p t u r e  may b e  superimposed  on 
t h e  game s o  t h a t  un ique   op t ima l  s t ra teg ies  are de te rmined .  ( T h i s  
makes t h e  problem a game of d e g r e e  i n  t h a t  r e g i o n . )  
The s i t u a t i o n  i n  t h e  r ema in ing  two  reg ions  i s  n o t  s o  c l e a r .  
I n  e f f e c t ,  bo th  p l a y e r s  are  p u r s u e r s  i n  W A B  and  bo th  are e v a d e r s  
i n  WD. However, t h e  prime g o a l   o f  each p l a y e r  i s  t o  a v o i d  b e i n g  
d r i v e n  i n t o  a less f a v o r a b l e  r e g i o n  a n d  e a c h  o n e  h o p e s  h i s  oppon- 
e n t  w i l l  make a mistake h e  can  take advan tage  o f .  T h e r e  d o e s   n o t  
a p p e a r  t o  be any r a t i o n a l e  f o r  s u p e r i m p o s i n g  a payoff  on  e i t h e r  o f  
these r e g i o n s .  
An Example 
To g i v e  a c learer  p i c t u r e  o f  t h e  ideas j u s t  d i s c u s s e d ,  we 
sha l l  c o n s i d e r  a very  s i m p l e  example.  Many c o m p l i c a t e d   f e a t u r e s  
are  n e g l e c t e d  i n  o r d e r  t h a t  some d i r e c t  r e s u l t s  c a n  b e  deve loped  
w i t h  o n l y  i n t u i t i v e  a r g u m e n t s .  
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Problem Formula t ion- -Cons ider  two vehic les ,  A and B ,  tha t  
move i n  t h e  h o r i z o n t a l   p l a n e .   B o t h   v e h i c l e s   h a v e   e x a c t l y  t h e  
same p e r f o r m a n c e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s :  t h e  same f i x e d  s p e e d  V and t h e  
same minimum a l l o w a b l e  t u r n i n g  r a d i u s  R .  Both n g v l g a t e  by se lec t -  
i n g  a n  a p p r o p r i a t e  r a d i u s  o f  t u r n  a t  each  time i n s t a n t .  F o r  s i m -  
p l i c i t y  i t  i s  assumed tha t  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  f i r i n g  e n v e l o p e  o f  e a c h  
c r a f t  is merely a l i n e   s e g m e n t   o f   l e n g t h  R. It Ss f i x e d   r e l a t i v e  
t o  t he  c r a f t  a n d  is o r i e n t e d  a l o n g  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of t h e  v e l o c i t y  
v e c t o r .  T h i s  s i t u a t i o n  i s  r e p r e s e n t e d   i n   F i g u r e  9. 
The game i s  such  t h a t  i f  A e v e r  i n t e r s e c t s  t h e  l i n e  s e g m e n t  
RB, A l o s e s ;   a n d  i f  B e v e r  f a l l s  upon l i n e   s e g m e n t  E A ,  B l o s e s .  
T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  g o a l  o f  e a c h  p l a y e r  i s  t o  f o r c e  t h e  a n t a p o n i s t  i n t o  
h i s  f i r i n g  e n v e l o p e  w h i l e  keeping  himself o u t  of t h e  f i r i n p  en- 
v e l o p e   o f  h i s  opponent .  I t  i s  assumed t h a t  f a t a l i t y  i s  i n s t a n t  
so  tha t  t h e  game t e r m i n a t e s  w h e n e v e r  o n e  a i r c r a f t  e n t e r s  t h e  
o t h e r ' s  f i r i n g  e n v e l o p e .  
Only t h e  r e l a t i v e  k i n e m a t i c  e q u a t i o n s  n e e d  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  here .  
P o i n t  A may b e  t a k e n  as t h e  o r i g i n  w i t h  t he  v e l o c i t y  v e c t o r  VA 
c o i n c i d e n t  w i t h  t h e  y - a x i s .  Then x and y s p e c i f y  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of 
B r e l a t i v e  t o  A and 8 s p e c i f i e s  t h e  r e l a t i v e  f l y i n g  d i r e c t i o n  o f  
B w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  A .  ( S e e   F i g u r e  9 )  
Consequen t ly ,   ou r  pame e v o l v e s  i n  a th ree  d imens iona l  ( re la -  
t i v e )  s t a t e  s p a c e  w i t h  - Q) < x , y  < + and Oo - < 8 - < 3 6 0 O .  A t  
time t ,  t h e  e n t i r e  i n f o r m a t i o n  as t o  t h e  s t a t e  of t he  two a i r c r a f t  
i s  s p e c i f i e d  as a p o i n t  i n  t h i s  s t a t e  space. Under the  ( r e l a t i v e )  
combined  maneuvers  of A and B y  t h i s  s t a t e  p o i n t  x = ( x , y , 0 )  e v o l v e s  
from some g i v e n  i n i t i a l  s ta te  x, = ( x o J y o , O o )  a t  t = O  t o  some t e r -  
mina l  s t a t e  xf = ( x f , y f , B f ) .  The t e r m i n a l  s t a t e  I s  d e f i n e d  as 
67 
R A  = R g  = R = M I N I M U M   R A D I U S  O F  T U R N  
1,  = 1, = P = " E F F E C T I V E "   F I R I N G   R A N G E  
V A  = V B  = v = A I R C R A F T   S P E E D  
F I G . 9   S I M P L I F I E D   R E P R E S E N T A T I O N   O F   A I R - T O - A I R  
C O M B A T   O F   I D E N T I C A L   V E H I C L E S .   ( M O V I N G  
C O O R D I N A T E   S Y S T E M   C E N T E R E D   A T   A . )  
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t h e  s ta te  where a t  least  one  o f  t h e  a i r c ra f t  i s  i n s i d e  t h e  f i r e  
range   of  t h e  o t h e r  a n d  t h e  combat game t e r m i n a t e s  ( i g n o r i n g ,  f o r  
now, the c o n d i t i o n  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  t h e  draw).  
To cons id -e r  t he  t e r m i n a l  s ta te  i n  t h i s  r e l a t i v e  s p a c e ,  re fe r  
a g a i n  t o  F i g u r e  9 .  S i n c e   p o i n t  A i s  a l w a y s   f i x e d ,  it i s  c lear  
that  whenever x i s  such  tha t  x = 0 ,  0 - < y - < R, a i r c r a f t  B w i l l  be  
d e s t r o y e d .   I n   o t h e r   w o r d s ,   d e f i n e  
Thus,  $A c o n s i s t s  o f  a3.1 t h o s e  t e r m i n a l  s t a t e s  f a v o r a b l e  t o  A ,  
i . e .  , i f  xfcJI, t h e n  B l o s e s .  (See Flg.10) 
The s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h o s e  terminal  s t a t e s  f a v o r a b l e  t o  c r a f t  B y  
JIB i s  a b i t  more c o m p l i c a t e d .   C o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  s e v e r a l   s p e c i a l  
c a s e s  i n  F i g u r e l l w i l l  make i t  c l e a r .  When O f  = 0 ,  t h e  f a v o r a b l e  
s t a t e s  are d e f i n e d  by  B being diTect3.y behind A a t  a d i s t a n c e  
less  t h a n  R ( F i g . l l ( a ) ) .  When €If = g o o ,  t h e  s ta tes  are such  t h a t  
B i s  j u s t  a t  A ' s  l e f t  s ide  w i t h  d i s t a n c e  less t h a n  R, (Fig.11. ( b ) ) .  
S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  c a s e s  O f  = 1800 , 270° are  a l s o  c l e a r  f r o m  F i g u r e  
l l ( c ) a n d  ( d l ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
R e t u r n i n g  t o  F i g u r e  1 0 i t  i s  now easy t o  u n d e r s t a n d  that  $B 
i s  a h e l i c a l  t y p e  o f  s u r f a c e .  T h i s  s u r f a c e  i s  bounded  by t h e  
8-axis  and by a h e l i c a l  c u r v e  w i t h  h o r i z o n t a l  g e n e r a t r i x  o f  
l e n e t h  R. 
The un ion  o f  $A and JIB, JIAU JIB, compr ises  a l l  o f  t h e  p o s s i b l e  
t e r m i n a l  s tates f o r  which a t  l ea s t  one  of  t h e  a i r c r a f t  i s  knocked 
down and t h e  combat game ends .  It shou ld  b e  noted   f rom  F igure  1 0  
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F I G . 1 0  T E R M I N A T I O N   S U R F A C E S :  
$A = T E R M I N A L   S T A T E S   F A V O R A B L E   T O  A 
$B = T E R M I N A L   S T A T E S   F A V O R A B L E   T O  B 




( b )  e f  = 90° 
A 
( c )  e f  = 180° 
L4-F 270°  
( d )  e f  = 270° 
F I G . 1 1   T E R M I N A L   O R I E N T A T I O N S   F A V O R A B L E   T O  B 
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t h a t  there are some s ta tes  common to   bo th   and   namely  the 
l i n e   s e g m e n t s  POR and OQ which c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  i n t e r s e c t i o n  s e t  
$AB. On JIAB b o t h  A and B w i l l  b e  d e s t r o y e d  - by e i t h e r  c o l l i s i o n  
o r  m u t u a l  f i r i n g .  
Our problem i s :  g i v e n  a n y  i n i t i a l  s t a t e  x, = (xO,yO,~,) i n  
t h e  x-y-8 s p a c e ,  what i s  t h e  outcome of t h e  game when A and B 
p l a y   o p t i m a l l y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l   g o a l s ?  We d i s c u s s  
t h i s  q u e s t i o n  b e l o w .  
" S o l u t i o n  -. ~ ~ C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s - - I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  we examine some o f  
t h e  more i n t e r e s t i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  prob-  
lem j u s t  p o s e d .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  we i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  n a t u r e   o f  t h e  
v a r i o u s  r e g i o n s  o f  t h e  s t a t e  space  t ha t  c o r r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  p o s s i b l e  
outcomes  of t h e  d o g f i g h t .  We a l s o   p r e s e n t  some s p e c i f i c  cptimal 
t r a j e c t o r i e s .  We do   no t ,   however ,   g ive  t h e  "- c o m p l e t e   s o l u t i o n   t o  
t h e  problem. 
L e t  u s  a s s u m e ,  f o r  t h e  moment, t h a t  A and B a re  e n g a p e d  i n  a 
d u e l  t o  t h e  d e a t h .  Thus, w e  e l i m i n a t e ,   f o r  now, t h e  subspace  WD 
c o r r e s p o n d i n g   t o   b o t h   v e h i c l e s   e s c a p i n p .   S i n c e   a n d  $, are  s u r -  
f a c e s ,  a n d  Q, i s  r e d u c e d  t o  a cu rve  t h a t  i s  the   boundary   be tween 
$, and Q,, w e  can   a rgue  t h a t  WAB, which  connects  w i t h  qAB,  s e r v e s  
t o  separate W A  and W,. The s t a t e  s p a c e   d e c o r p o s i t i o n  might t h e n  
look   someth ing  l i k e  t ha t  shown i n  F i g u r e  1 2 .  
Whenever t h e  i n i t i a l  s t a t e  i s  t o  t h e  l e f t  s ide  of  W A E ,  t he  
game r e s u l t s  w i l l  b e  f a v o r a b l e  t o  A ;  whenever t h e  i n i t i a l  s t a t e  
i s  t o  t h e  r i g h t  s ide  o f  WAB, t h e  game r e s u l t s  w i l l  be f a v o r a b l e  
t o  B. If i n i t i a l l y  t h e  s t a t e  i s  i n  W A E ,  t h e n  i t  shou ld  b e  main- 
t a i n e d  i n  i t ,  and t h e  outcome  would be a m u t u a l  d e s t r u c t i o n ,  i . e . ,  
t h e  t r a j e c t o r y  r u n s  somehow w i t h i n  s p a c e  W A B  u n t i l  i t  h i t s  $,. 
71 
- 
FIG.12 QUALITIVE ILLUSTRATIObI OF STATE-SPACE DECOMPOSITION 
72 
Now w e  r e t u r n  t o  F i g u r e  1 0 a n d  t r y  t o  d e f i n e  t h e  s u b s p a c e s  W A ,  
WB and WAB. Inasmuch as the v e h i c l e s   h a v e   e q u a l   c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  
one would expect  t he  t e r m i n a l  s u r f a c e s  $, and qB t o  be e s s e n t i a l l y  
t h e  same. This  n o t   b e i n g  t h e  c a s e  i n  t h e  g i v e n   c o o r d i n a t e   s y s t e m ,  
a c o o r d i n a t e   t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  ‘s s u g g e s t e d .   C o n s i d e r   F i g u r e  13: w e  
keep t h e  o r i g i n  A f i x e d  h u t  r o t a t e  t k . -  x-y frame w i t h  a n g l e  e, 
where i s  h a l f  t h e  angle   be tween t h e  v e c t o r  VA and VB. The new 
s t a t e  0 r anges  f rom -90’ t o  +goo,  and $A and $B i n  t h e  new c o o r d i -  
n a t e s  are  as shown i n  F i g u r e 1 4 .  The s t r u c t u r e  i s  now t w o  h e l i c a l  
s u r f a c e s  t h a t  a re  3ymmetric w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  b o t h  t h e  o r i g i n  a n d  
the  p l a n e  y=O. It  i s  t h e n   o b v i o u s  t h a t  t h e  decompos i t ion   o f  the  
s p a c e  s h o u l d  a l s o  b e  symmetr ic  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  o r i g i n  a n d  t h e  
p l a n e  y=O. S i n c e  WAB has t o  pass t h e  l i n e   s e g m e n t s  PQ,RS,POR, 
t h e  p l a n e  y=O has t o  b e l o n g  t o  WAB ({y=O)  C W A B ) .  I t  f o l l o w s  
tha t  W A C  i y > O )  and Wq C { y < O ) .  I n s o f a r  as a i r c r a f t  A and a i r r  
c r a f t  B h a v e  e x a c t l y  t h e  same p e r f o r m a n c e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  i t  i s  
n a t u r a l  t h a t  t h e y  h a v e  e x a c t l y  t h e  same c h a n c e s  t o  l o s e  o r  t o  w i n .  
So t h e  volumes of W A  and WB shou ld  b e  equa l  and  t h e i r  shapes 
shou ld  b e  symmetr ic .  -f 
To u n d e r s t a n d  more  about W A B ,  l e t  u s  c o n s i d e r  t h e  t r a j e c t o r i e s  
on t h e  p l a n e  y=O, or t h e  c a s e  t ha t  a i r c r a f t  B i s  always on t h e  
x-ax is  (see F i g . l S d .  The t.wo c r a f t  are  tu rn ing   symmet r i ca l ly   and  
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y   u n t i l  t h e y  are o p p o s e d   t o   e a c h   o t h e r   t h e n  t h e y  
approach   each   o ther   and   open  f i r e  when t h e  d i s t a n c e  i s  shor t  enough .  
The  r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  x and 8 i s  x = c o n s t a n t  ” + 2RcosO. The o p t i m a l  
t r a j e c t o r i e s  are  t h e n  t h o s e  shown i n  F i g u y e  1 5 b .  They w i l l  s t a y  o n  
t h e  p l a n e  y=O, and t h e  whole   p lane  y=O b e l o n g s   t o  W A B .  No one- 
s ide-win  or draw c a n  e x i s t  t h e r e .  
‘On the  o t h e r  h a n d ,  i f  a i r c r a f t  A i s  more c a p a b l e  t h a n  B ( f o r  ex- 
ample, A has grea te r  speed, smaller t u r n i n g  r a d i u s ,  or l o n g e r  
f i . re  r a n g e ,   e t c . ) ,  A shou ld   have  b e t t e r  c h a n c e   t o   w i n .   I n  t h i s  
c a s e ,  WA w i l l  b e  larger  t h a n  WB and WAB w i l l  b e  b e n t  away from W A g  
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a )  PATH  GEOMETRY 
I. 
P Q 
b) OPTIMAL TRAJECTORIES 
FIG.15 P A T H S  F O R  MUTUAL DESTRUCTION I N  THE P L A N E  y = 0 
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A n o t h e r  s p e c i a l  case o f  i n t e r e s t  i s  t h e  p l a n e  8+O0 ( o r  
8 = - 9 0 ° ) .  Here t h e  v e l o c i t y  d i r e c t i o n s  o f  A and B are opposed t o  
each o t h e r  w i t h  a d i f f e r e n c e   o f  180° (F ig .  1 6 ) .  Then, A and B 
c a n  a l w a y s  e x t e r m i n a t e  each o t h e r ,  i f  b o t h  make a n  o u t s i d e  t u r n  
(case ( a ) )  and   t hen   open  f i r e  when t h e y  meet. I n  t h i s  case t h e  
whole 8=90° p l a n e  w o u l d  b e l o n g  t o  WAq7; WD d o e s  n o t  e x i s t  here. 
However, i f  we assume, a t  t h i s  t i m e ,  t ha t  t h e  two p layers  prefer 
h a v i n g  a draw t o  m u t u a l  e x t e r m i n a t i o n ,  t h e i r  o p t i m a l  t r a j e c t o r i e s  
shou ld  be a n   i n s i d e - t u r n ,  l i k e  tha t  i n  F i g u r e   1 6 ( b ) .  If i t  i s  
i m p o s s i b l e  t o  d o  s o ,  t h e y  c a n  j u s t  f l y  s t r a i g h t l y  a n d  f o r g e t  each 
o t h e r .  Anyway, t h e y  c a n   a l w a y s   a v o i d   t o t a l   e x t e r m i n a t i o n .  The 
whole   p lane  8 = 9 0 ° ,  e x c e p t  t h e  l i n e   s e g m e n t  (-L<x<O,y=O), " would 
t h e n  b e l o n g  t o  WD. The decompos i t ion  of the  space  depend8  oery 
much on our  assumptions as t o  p i l o t  p r e f e r e n c e .  
The s u b s p a c e  o f  a draw, WD, i s  d e f i n e d  as t h e  u n i o n  o f  t h o s e  
s ta tes  that  d o   n o t .   r e s u l t   i n   t e r m i n a t i o n   o n  $ A ,  $B o r  $ A B .  Each 
p i l o t  c a n  n o t  c h a n g e  a t r a j e c t o r y  i n  WD u n i l a t e r 2 l l y  t o  h i s  ad- 
v a n t a g e .  So, t r a j e c t o r i e s  s t a r t i n g  i n  WD shou ld  always s t ay  i n  
WD w i t h o u t  c r o s s i n g  t h e  b o u n d a r i e s  t o  e i t h e r  WA, o r  WB, o r  WAB. 
Two s p e c i a l  t y p e s  o f  t r a j e c t o r i e s  i n  WD may be d i s t i n g u i s h e d :  
(1) s t a t i o n a r y  p o i n t s ,  t h a t  i s  p o i n t s  f o r  which t h e  two c r a f t  
never  change  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  i n  s u b s e q u e n t  m a n e u v e r i n g ,  
( 2 )  c l o s e d  l o o p s ,  i . e . ,  t h e  i n i t i a l  s t a t e  po in t   moves ,   bu t  i t  
f o l l o w s  some cyc le  p e r i o d i c a l l y  ( n e i t h e r  o f  t h e  p l a y e r s  c a n  break 
t h e  stalemate h imsel f ) .  O t h e r  i r r e g u l a r  t r a j e c t o r i e s  t h a t  are  
n o t  s t a t i o n a r y  p o i n t s  o r  clcsed l o o p s ,  b u t  always remain i n  WD 
are a l s o   p o s s i b l e .   U n d o u b t e d l y ,  t h e  shape of WD w i l l  be ve ry  
c o m r i i c a t e d .  To describe i t  comple t e ly  i s  beyond t h e  
scope   o f  t h i s  r e p o r t .  Here, we are j u s t  g o i n g  t o  e x p l o r e  some 
special  s e c t i o n s  o f  WD t o  show i t s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  t h e  o t h e r  
r e g i o n s .  The main  purpose i s  t o  get  a f e e l i n g  f o r  t h e  ideas 
p r e v i o u s l y  p r e s e n t e d .  
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a )  MUTUAL-DESTRUCTION PATH 
b)  PATH FOR A DRAW 
FIG.16 POSSIBLE PATHS I N  PLANE 8=90° 
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Cons ide r  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  which one c r a f t  i s  d i r e c t l y  beh ind  
t h e  o t h e r  b u t  the r e l a t i v e  d i s t a n c e  b e t w e e n  them i s  greater t h a n  
the f i r i n g  r a n g e , l l .  I n  s u c h  a case t h e  lead v e h i c l e   m u s t   c o n t i n u e  
t o  dash ( i . e . ,  f l y  a s t ra ight  c o u r s e  a t  max-speed)   s ince   any   tu rn-  
ing  maneuver  would  shor ten  t h e  d i s t a n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  him and h i s  
p u r s u e r . "   S i n c e   b o t h   v e h i c l e s   h a v e  t h e  same c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  the 
r e l a t i v e  p o s i t i o n s  r e m a i n  f i x e d  a n d  we have  a " s t a t i o n a r y "  draw. 
States  fo r  wh ich  t h i s  i s  t h e  c a s e  l i e  on t h e  t w o  h a l f - l i n e s  M-y- 
and N-y" shown i n  F i g u r e  1 7 . t  A s e c o n d  k i n d  o f  " s t a t i o n a r y "  draw 
i n v o l v e s   t u r n i n g   m a n e u v e r s .   I n   p a r t i c u l a r ,  i t  o c c u r s  when b o t h  
v e h i c l e s  are t u r n i n g  i n  t h e  same c i r c l e  b u t  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  p o s i -  
t i o n  r e m a i n s  f i x e d .  F o r  s u c h  t o  b e  t h e  case t h e i r  p o s i t i o n   m u s t  
be as shown i n  F i g u r e  18 ,  i . e . ,  t h e  a n g l e  AOB must be e q u a l  t o  
28  and B must be i n  t h e  y-8 p l a n e .  The l o c u s  o f  these p o i n t s  i s  
g i v e n  by  x=O, y = - + 2 R  s i n  8 ,  where R i s  t h e  minimum t u r n i n g  r a d i u s .  
Curves EOF and GOH i n  F i g u r e 1 7  c o r r e s p o n d  t o  i n i t i a l  s ta tes  f o r  
t h i s  k i n d  o f  s t a t i o n a r y  draw. 
11 
To p r o v i d e  a n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  how t h e  "barriers" a r i se  and 
separate t h e  r e g i o n s ,   c o n s i d e r  the  case shown i n   F i g u r e  19. The 
p o s i t i o n  o f  B i s  t o  t h e  l e f t  and rear  o f  A and t h e  v a l u e  o f  8 i s  
nega t ive .   Thus ,  t h e  i n i t i a l  s ta te  c o r r e s p o n d s   t o   p o i n t s  l i k e  U ,  
J o r  V i n  F i g u r e  17. Now B has b e t t e r  t a c t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  t h a n  A 
has. The t a c t i c  f o r  A i s  t o  make a f u l l  r i g h t  t u r n  t o  e v a d e ,  
whereas tha t  f o r  B i s  t o  make a f u l l  r i g h t  t u r n  t o  p u r s u e .  
After f o l l o w i n g  some arcs o f  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  c i r c l e s ,  t h e y  f l y  
s t r a i g h t l y  a l o n g  the common t a n g e n t  l i n e  o f  t he  two c i r c l e s  (see 
Fig .  19). 
t t  
~ ~ 
tNo t i ce  that  i f  m u t u a l  d e s t r u c t i o n  i s  prefer red  t o  a draw, n o t  
t t I n  a n  a c t u a l  c o m b a t  s i t u a t i o n  A migh t  t u r n  i n t o  B inasmuch as he  
i s  n o t  l i k e l y  t o  be " k i l l e d "  by  a n  i n s t a n t a n e o u s  t r a v e r s e  o f  t he  
f i r i n g  c o n e .  
a l l  of these l i n e s  w i l l  be  i n  WD - par t  o f  them w i l l  b e l o n g  t o  WAB.  
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FIG.17 P A R T I A L   S T A T E - S P A C E   D E C O M P O S I T I O N  F O R  S I M P L E   X A M P L E  
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If o r i g l n a l l y , B  i s  so  far  away from A t h a t ,  a f te r  t u r n i n g ,  
B ' s  f i r e  r a n g e  i s  s t i l l  t o o  far  back  from A ,  t h e  t w o  v e h i c l e s  
j u s t  k e e p  f l y i n g ,  a n d  t h e  f i n a l  r e s u l t  i s  a draw. I n  F i g u r e  1 7 ,  
t h i s  c o r r e s p o n d s  tcj the t r a j e c t o r y  VW. We u n d e r s t a n d  t h a t  V W E W ~ .  
If i n i t i a l l y ,  B i s  n e a r  e n o u g h  t o  A s o  t ha t  B c a n  s h o o t  A 
down d u r i n g  t h e  t w n   o r  a f te r  f i n i s h i n g  t h e  t u r n  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  
t r a j e c t o r y  w i l l  look l i k e  cu rve  UT i n  F i g u r e  17 .  T i s  a p o i n t  o n  t h e  
s u r f a c e  qB, where a i rc r3f t  A i s  d e s t r o y e d .  So UTEW~.  
However, there  must be  some c a s e s  when t h e  i n i t i a l  d i s t a n c e  
between A and B i s  such  that ,  a f t e r  t u r n i n g ,  t h e  f r o n t  t i p  o f  B 1 s  
f i r e  r a n g e ,  tB, i s  j u s t  a t  t h e  margin 01' r e a c h i n g  a i r c r a f t  A .  
Any i n c r e a s e  o f  t h e i r  i n i t i a l  d i s t a n c e  w o u l d  make B miss A ,  w h i l e ,  
any decrease o f  t h i s  d i s t a n c e  w o u l d  g u a r a n t e e  B d e s t r o y i n g  A .  
T h i s  marg ina l  case c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  t h e  t r a j e c t o r y  a r c  of J N  I n  
F i g u r e  1 7 .  Hence, N i s  j u s t  on t h e  rim o f  QB. 
Some o f  t h e  o t h e r  m a r g i n a l  o p t i m a l  t r a j e c t o r i e s  c o r r e s p o n d i n e  
t o  t he  o t h e r  i n i t i a l  s ta tes  are drawn as a r c s  LM and K N  i n  F i g u r e  
17 .  We can  now assert t h a t  a r c s  J N  and K N  must b e  on t h e  boundary 
s u r f a c e  t ha t  d i v i d e s  WD and WB, w h i l e  a r c  LM must b e  on t h e  
boundary that  d i v i d e s  WD and WA. Thus, these  c u r v e s   c o n s t i t u t e  
p o r t i o n s   o f  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  barriers.  To i l l u s t r a t e ,  t h e  s i t u a -  
t i o n  f o r  t h e  p l a n e  8=Oo i s  shown q u a l i t a t i v e l y  i n  F i p u r e  2 0 .  
Summary 
I n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  w e  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  dogf igh t   p rob lem.  We saw 
that  t h i s  problem was comprised o f  two pa r t s :  namely ,   " ro le -  
s e l e c t i o n "   a n d   p u r s u i t - e v a s i o n .  We d e v e l o p e d   a n   a p p r o a c h   t o  t h e  
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i n t o  r e g i o n s  t h a t  c o r r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  ( f o u r )  p o s s i b l e  o u t c o m e s  o f  
a n  ae r i a l  d u e l .  T h i s  a p p r o a c h   a p p e a r s   t o  b e  i n n o v a t i v e  w i t h  re- 
spect  t o  t h e  d o g f i g h t  p r o b l e m ,  a l t h o u g h  i t  i s  c l o s e l y  related t o  
I s a a c s '  a n a l y t i c  a n d  g e o m e t r i c  m e t h o d s  f o r  p u r s u i t - e v a s i o n  "games 
o f  k i n d .  
A s i m p l e  d o g f i g h t  p r o b l e m  was a n a l y z e d  i n  some d e t a i l  i n  
o r d e r  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  ideas i n v o l v e d   i n   o u r   a p p r o a c h .  The  d i f -  
f i c u l t i e s  e n c o u n t e r e d  i n  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  suggest t h a t  s o l v i n g  rea l -  
i s t i c  d o g f i g h t  p r o b l e m s  i n  t h i z  manner may well  b e  i m p r a c t i c a l .  
However, a combina t ion   of  t h e  c o n c e p t s  i n t r o d u c e d  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  
and the  computa t iona l  t echn iques  deve loped  e a r l i e r  may prove  
f r u i t f u l .  
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6 .  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
I n  t h i s  r e p o r t  we h a v e  p r e s e n t e d  t h e  s a l i e n t  r e s u l t s  o f  a 
s t u d y  t o  a p p l y  d i f f e r e n t i a l  game t h e o r y  t o  a e r i a l  combat problems. 
I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  w e  examined the r o l e  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  game t h e o r y  
i n  aer ia l  combat  problems (Chap te r  2 ) ;  w e  deve loped  a new approach  
t o  manned aer ia l  combat games ( C h a p t e r  3 )  and app l i ed  i t  t o  two 
c lass ica l  d i f f e r e n t i a l  game problems (Chap te r  4 ) ;  l a s t l y ,  we sug- 
gested a n  a p p r o a c h  t o  t h e  " d o g f i g h t "  p r o b l e m  a n d  i l l u s t r a t e d  t h e  
approach  b y  a s imple  example ( C h a p t e r  5 ) .  
The e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a t e - o f - t h e  a r t  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  game 
t h e o r y  r e v e a l e d  t h e  n e e d  f o r  c o m p u t a t i o n a l  a p p r o a c h e s  t o  s o l v i n g  
t h e  "games" p r o b l e m s   a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a e r i a l  combat. We developed  
such   an   approach  by r e f o r m u l a t i n g  t h e  problem.  The  new formula-  
t i o n  was a r r i v e d  a t  from a c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  in fo rma t ion  upon  
which p i l o t s  base c o n t r o l  d e c i s i o n s  a n d  o f  t h e  n a t u r e  of  t h e  de- 
c i s i o n s   t h e m s e l v e s .  
As we view i t ,  t h e  a e r i a l  combat game i s  p l a y e d  i n  a d i s c r e -  
t i z e d  state-space. The d i s c r e t e  s t a t e s  c o r r e s p o n d   t o   " b l o c k s "   i n  
t h e  c o n t i n u o u s  s t a t e - s p a c e ;  these b l o c k s  r e f l e c t  t h e  i n a b i l i t y  o f  
a p i l o t  t o  " l o c a t e "  h i s  o p p o n e n t   p r e c i s e l y .  A p i l o t ' s  c o n t r o l  
d e c i s i o n  i s  a c h o i c e  o f  o n e  o u t  o f  a f i n i t e  s e t  of  "canonica l  con-  
t r o l  maneuvers."  Thus,  knowing tha t  h i s  opponent i s  l o c a t e d  w i t h -  
i n  a g i v e n  b l o c k ,  e a c h  p i l o t  must  decide which of  h i s  a v a i l a b l e  
maneuvers  would best s e r v e  h i s  own g o a l .  
The above  assumpt ions  were shown t o  r e d u c e  t h e  a e r i a l  combat 
game t o  a d i s c r e t e  Markov game. Computa t iona l   me thods   fo r   so lv inp  
such  games were a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e .  These methods were 
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m o d i f i e d  u s i n g  c o n c e p t s  o f  s t a t e  increment  dynamic  programming. 
The m o d i f i c a t i o n s  are a p p e a l i n g  f r o m  a p h y s i c a l  s t . a n d p o i n t ,  a n d  
t h e y  r e s u l t  i n  a t r emendous  sav ing  o f  computa t ion  time and h igh-  
speed  memory r e q u i r e m e n t s .  
The computa t ion  scheme was u s e d  t o  s o l v e  a n a l o g u e s  o f  t w o  
c l a s s i c  d i f f e r e n t i a l  game problems,  t h e  "Homicidal   Chauffeur  
Problem,"  and the "Two-Car Problem." These a p p l i c a t i o n s  demon- 
s t r a t e  t h e  b a s i c  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  a p p r o a c h  a n d  a l s o  g a v e  a n  i n d i c a -  
t i o n  o f  i t s  f u t u r e  u s e f u l n e s s .  
Our  approach t o  t h e  dogf ight  problem embodied  concepts  f rom 
both  nonzero-sum games and games of k i n d .  E s s e n t i a l l y ,  t h e  dog- 
f i g h t  problem was c o n s i d e r e d  as havinp  two pa r t s :  namely, t h e  
problem of d e c i d i n g  w h i c h  p l a y e r  s h o u l d  be a pursuer  and  which  an  
e v a d e r  ( r o l e - s e l e c t i o n  p r o b l e m ) ,  a n d ,  t h e  pu r su i t - evas ion   p ro t j l em.  
We concen t r a t ed  on  t h e  ro l e - se l ec t ion  p rob lem and  showed  how t h e  
s t a t e - s p a c e  mipht  be decomposed i n t o  r e p i o n s  c o r r e s p o n d i n p  t o  t h e  
f o u r   p o s s i b l e   o u t c o m e s   o f  a d o g f i g h t .  These r e p i o n s ,   w h i c h  a re  
separated by "bar r ie rs , "  c a n  s e r v e  t o  d e f i n e  t h e  r o l e s  o f  t h e  
p l a y e r s .  A s imple example was s t u d i e d  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  ideas 
a n d  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h i s  a p p r o a c h  t o  t h e  dogf igh t  p rob lem.  
Problem Areas a n d  S u g p e s t i o n s  f o r  F u r t h e r  R e s e a r c h  
The concep tua l - computa t iona l  approach  we h a v e  t a k e n  t o  a e r i a l  
combat  problems seems t o  have great p o t e n t i a l .  As n o t e d  e a r l i e r ,  
s t o c h a s t i c  e f f e c t s  are  a b s o r b e d  i n  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t y  
mat r ix   and  a re  t h u s   a c c o u n t e d   f o r   d i r e c t l y   a n d   s i m p l y .   C o n v e r p e n t  
a l g o r i t h m s  are a v a i l a b l e  f o r  s o l v i n p  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  Markov game 
and t h e  s o l u t i o n s  are  of t h e  feedback  t y p e .  The p h y s i c a l l y  mean- 
i n g f u l  a s p e c t s  of t h e  a e r i a l  combat  problem are  t h u s  d i r e c t l y  
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r e v e a l e d .  One need   no t  be  concerned w i t h  d e t e r m i n i n g  the  v a r i o u s  
s i n g u l a r  s u r f a c e s  t h a t  c h a r a c t e r i z e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  game s o l u t i o n s  
as descr ibed by Isaacs. None the le s s ,   ou r   app roach  i s  i n  i t s  i n -  
fancy   and  there are problems that  need t o  b e  r e s o l v e d .  We d i s c u s s  
some of  these b e l o w .   F o r   d i s c u s s i o n   p u r p o s e s ,  i t  i s  conven ien t  
t o  d i v i d e  t h e  p r o b l e m s   i n t o   t w o   c a t e g o r i e s :   c o m p u t a t i o n a l   a n d  
a n a l y t i c a l   ( o r   t h e o r e t i c a l ) .  However,  one  must r e a l i z e  that  com- 
p u t a t i o n a l  a n d  a n a l y t i c a l  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  method are  c l o s e l y  i n -  
t e r t w i n e d .  
Computat ional  Problems--The most  pressing problem w i t h  o u r  
a p p r o a c h  i n  i t s  p r e s e n t  f o r m  c o n c e r n s  t h e  computa t iona l   load   and  
s t o r a g e   r e q u i r e m e n t s   a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  method. While  t h e  com- 
p u t a t i o n a l  demands are n o t  as e x c e s s i v e  as t h o s e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
of   dynamic  programming's   "curse of d i m e n s i o n a l i t y , "  t h e y  are 
n e v e r t h e l e s s   c o n s i d e r a b l e .  The r e q u i r e m e n t   f o r   o b t a i n i n p  t h e  
t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  p i j ( u , v ) ,  f o r  a l l  i , u ,   and   v ,   imposes  
t h e  largest  computa t iona l   bu rden .  W h i l e  each   computa t ion  i s  
s i m p l e  i n  i t s e l f ,  a r e a l i s t i c  p r o b l e m  c o u l d  n e c e s s i t a t e  o v e r  o n e  
m i l l i o n   s u c h   c a l c u l a t i o n s .  A r e l a t ed  problem i s  t h e  s t o r a g e   o f  
t h e  p I s .  R a p i d   a c c e s s   c o r e   s t o r a g e  may n o t  be p o s s i b l e   a n d  
r e a d i n g  a n d  w r i t i n g  f r o m  o t h e r  s t o r a g e  d e v i c e s  ( tapes ,  d i s c s ,  e t c . )  
may b e  n e c e s s a r y .  T h i s  wou ld   i nc rease  t h e  e f f e c t i v e   c o m p u t a t i o n  
time . 
i j  
It shou ld  be  no ted  t h a t  t h e  p ' s  can  b e  computed  independ- 
i j  
e n t l y  of t h e  o p t i m i z a t i o n  a l p o r i t h m ,  i . e . ,  b e f o r e  s o l v i n g  t h e  
opt imiza t ion   problem.   Inasmuch as t h e  p ' s  are independen t   o f  
t h e  p a y o f f ,  i t  would be p o s s i b l e  t o  c h a n g e  p a y o f f s  w i t h o u t  h a v i n g  
t o   r e c o m p u t e  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n   p r o b a b i l i t i e s .   I n   a d d i t i o n ,   i n s o f a r  
as it  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  c o n s t r a i n t s  by " p e n a l t i e s "  i n  
t h e  p a y o f f ,  s t u d y i n g  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  c h a n g i n g  these c o n s t r a i n t s  
13  
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would n o t   r e q u i r e   r e c o m p u t i n g  t h e  p I s .  On t h e  o t h e r   h a n d ,  if 
c h a n g e s  i n  v e h i c l e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  are t o  b e  s t u d i e d  a n d  i f  these 
changes  can  only  b e  a c c o u n t e d  f o r  by a l t e r i n g  t h e  e q u a t i o n s  o f  
mot ion ,  t hen  a new s e t  o f  t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  w o u l d  h a v e  t o  
b e  computed   for   each   chanpe .  T h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  c e r t a i n   p a r a m e t r i c  
s t u d i e s  c o u l d  be  q u i t e  e x p e n s i v e  c o m p u t a t i o n a l l y .  
i d  
Ano the r  computa t iona l  phase o f  t h e  approach  i s  t h e  i t e r a t i v e  
s o l u t i o n   o f  the  d i s c r e t e  Markov game. T h i s  a s p e c t   o f  t h e  compu- 
t a t i o n  i s  less  demanding  than i s  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s   b u t  i t  i s ,  n o n e t h e l e s s ,   n o n t r i v i a l .  It  appears t h a t  
a p p r o x i m a t e l y  o n e - t h i r d  o f  t h e  t o t a l  c o m p u t a t i o n a l  e f f o r t  i n  ob- 
t a i n i n g  a s o l u t i o n  w i l l  b e  consumed i n  t h e  i t e r a t i v e  p r o c e d u r e .  
The above  computa t iona l  r equ i r emen t s  raisr  q u e s t i o n s  as t o  
t he  f e a s i b i l i t y  o f  s o l v i n p  r e a l i s t i c  p r o b l e m s  u s i n p  t h i s  approach .  
It  i s  n a t u r a l  t o  ask,  f o r  example, how l a r g e  a problem cou ld  b e  
s o l v e d  a t  a r e a s o n a b l e  c o s t  .' Answering t h i s  Q u e s t i o n  w i l l  r e q u i r e  
f o r m u l a t i n g  s p e c i f i c  p r o b l e m s  a n d  e s t i m a t i n g  t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  com- 
p u t a t i o n a l   r e q u i r e m e n t s   a n d   c o s t s .  T h i s  appears t o  be  a most ap- 
p r o p r i a t e   a v e n u e   t o   p u r s u e .   I n   f a c t ,  i t  seems m a n i f e s t l y  des i r -  
a b l e  t o  a p p l y  t h e  t e c h n i q u e ,  as c u r r e n t l y  f o r m u l a t e d ,  t o  what might 
be €ermed a r e a l i s t i c   p r o b l e m .  Such   an   app l i ca t ion   wou ld   p rov ide  
a n s w e r s  t o  a meaningfu l  problem as well  as a n  i n d i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  
c o m p u t a t i o n a l  f e a s i b i l i t y  of  t h e  approach .  
T I n  making  such a de te rmina t ion  one  mus t ,  o f  cour se ,  weieht the  
va lue  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  s o l u t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  c o s t  f o r  o b t a i n i n g  i t .  
I n  d o i n g  t h i s ,  i t  must b e  k e p t  i n  mind t h a t  a f e e d b a c k  ( o r  a 
. g l o b a l )  s o l u t i o n  i s  ob ta ined  us ing  ou r  approach  and  t h a t  such  a 
s o l u t i o n  i s  of much g r e a t e r  v a l u e  t h a n  a n  o p e n - l o o p  a n s w e r  f o r  
one s e t  o f  i n i t i a l  c o n d i t i o r l s .  
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Methods for  r e d u c i n g  the c o m p u t a t i o n a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  s h o u l d  
a l s o  be  i n v e s t i g a t e d .  An i m p o r t a n t  area f o r  research i s  t h e  ex- 
a m i n a t i o n  o f  t e c h n i q u e s  f o r  a m e l i o r a t i n g  t h e  l o a d  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  
computing t h e  p ' s .  One obvious   t echnique   would  b e  t o   u s e  a 
c o a r s e r ,   n o n u n i f o r m ,   s t a t e - s p a c e   d i s c r e t i z a t i o n .   A n o t h e r  i s  t o  
n e g l e c t  ( o r  p r o h i b i t )  t r a n s i t i o n s  a c r o s s  t h e  "edpes" o r  " c o r n e r s "  
o f  a s ta te  "block."   Programming  techniques,   such as word-packing 
schemes, t ha t  h e l p  a l l e v i a t e  s t o r a g e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  s h o u l d  a l s o  b e  
i n v e s t i g a t e d .   F i n a l l y ,   m o r e  r a p i d  a l g o r i t h m s   f o r   i t e r a t i n g   o n  
t h e  game s o l u t i o n   s h o u l d  be  s o u g h t .   P o s s i b i l i t i e s   r a n g e   f r o m  
H o w a r d ' s  " i t e r a t i o n  i n  p o l i c y  space" ( R e f . 3 3 )  t o  u s i n g  n o n l i n e a r  
programming  and  "over-relaxat ion"  methods.  
1 3  
Analy t ica l  Problems--There  are a number  of  ques t ions  of  an  
a n a l y t i c a l  n a t u r ;  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  approach  t h a t  a l s o  p r e s e n t  them- 
s e l v e s .  We mention j u s t  a few of them here .  
One o f  t h e  more i m p o r t a n t  a n a l y t i c a l  q u e s t i o n s  c o n c e r n s  t h e  
e x i s t e n c e   o f  a s a d d l e - p o i n t   s o l u t i o n   t o  t h e  Markov  game. C u r r e n t l y ,  
we are a s s u r e d  o f  o b t a i n i n g  a min-max ( o r  max-min) s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  
problerr! we have  posed ( i . e . ,  s o l u t i o n s  t o  t he  s o - c a l l e d  m a j o r a n t  
games). We could  compare max-min and min-max answers ;  i f  t h e y  are 
e q u a l ,  we have a saddle-point .   However ,  t h i s  r e q u i r e s  two i t e r a -  
t i v e  s o l u t i o n s ,  a n d  a b e t t e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  t o  seek n e c e s s a r y  a n d  
s u f f i c i e n t   c o n d i t i o n s   f o r  a s a d d l e - p o i n t  t o  e x i s t .  I n  t h i s  con- 
n e c t i o n  w e  ment ion t h a t  t h e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  Eq.  ( 3 . 1 3 )  g u a r a n t e e s  
t h e  e x i s t e n c e   o f  a s a d d l e - p o i n t .  The c o n d i t i o n  I s  a n a l o g o u s   t o  
r e q u i r i n g  t h e  H a m i l t o n i a n   t o   h a v e  a s a d d l e - p o i n t .   U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  
t he  c o n d i t i o n  c a n  o n l y  be v e r i f i e d  i f  a n a l y t i c  e x p r e s s i o n s  f o r  
t h e  p ' s  are  a v a i l a b l e   a n d   s u c h  i s  n o t  l i k e l y  t o  b e  t h e  c a s e .  
It w i l l  b e  no ted  t h a t  i f  t h e  p ' s  and t h e  c ' s  are  separable 
w i t h  respect  t o  u a n d  v ,  t h e n  t h e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  E q .  ( 3 . 1 3 )  i s  
o b v i o u s .   I n  mzny phys ica l   p rob lems   one  might expect  t h i s  s e p a r a -  
t i o n  t o  e x i s t .  
i j  
i J  i j  
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We c o n s i d e r  t h e  Markov game t o  be  t h e  fundamenta l  p roblem 
a n d   n o t   a n   a p p r o x i m a t i o n   t o  a c o n t i n u o u s  d i f f e r e n t i a l  game. Never- 
theless ,  i t  would be u s e f u l  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  r e l a t i o n  o f  t h e  Markov 
game t o  a c o r r e s p o n d i n g   c o n t i n u o u s   d i f f e r e n t i a l  game. I n   p a r t i c u -  
l a r ,  one might l i k e  t o  know under  what c o n d i t i o n s  t h e  s o l u t i o n  t o  
t h e  Markov game approaches  t h a t  o f  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
game. To answer  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  t h e  l i m i t i n g  b e h a v i o r  o f  t h e  s o l u -  
t i o n  t o  t h e  Markov game would  have t o  b e  i n v e s t i g a t e d  as t h e  d i s -  
c r e t i z a t i o n  becomes f i n e r .  
I n  t h e  t w o  a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  our approach ,  t h e  problems were 
f o r m u l a t e d  w i t h  b o t h  p layers  hav ing  t h e  same i n f o r m a t i o n  s e t s .  
The method  should be ex tended  t o  t h e  c a s e  where t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  
sets  f o r  t h e  two p layers  are  d i f f e r e n t .  T h i s  will b e  e s p e c i a l l y  
i m p o r t a n t  i f  t h e  approach  i s  t o  b e  u s e d  f o r  t h e  "dogf igh t "  p rob lem.  
The  manner i n  which t h i s  e x t e n s i o n  i s  t o  be a c c o m p l i s h e d  i s . a n  
area f o r   s t u d y .   S p e c i f y i n g  t h e  " c a n o n i c a l   m a n e u v e r s "   f o r  t h e  two 
examples was a t r i v i a l  matter.  D e t e r m i n i n g   a p p r o p r i a t e   c a n o n i c a l  
maneuver s  fo r  more r e a l i s t i c  p r o b l e m s  w i l l  n o t  be  s o  easy and w i l l  
r equ i r e  f u r t h e r  s t u d y .  
Dogfight  Problem--As  noted e a r l i e r ,  t h e  a n a l y t i c - g e o m e t r i c  
a p p r o a c h  t o  t h e  d o g f i g h t  p r o b l e m  o u t l i n e d  i n  Chap te r  5 i s  n o t  
l i k e l y  t o  p r o v i d e  n u m e r i c a l  a n s w e r s  f o r  r e a s o n a b l y  r e a l i s t i c  p r o b -  
lems. T h i s  i s  n o t   s u r p r i s i n g   i n   v i e w   o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n  o f  t h i s  
a p p r o a c h  t o  t h e  more " c l a s s i c a l "  m e t h o d s  o f  a t t a c k i n g  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
games. However, t h e  approach  i s  u s e f u l   c o n c e p t u a l l y   a n d  i t  might  
be b e n e f i c i a l  t o  a t tempt  t o  employ i t  i n  c o n j u n c t i c z  w i t h  t h e  com- 
p u t a t i o n a l   t e c h n i q u e  we have   deve loped .  The manner i n  which t h i s  
cou ld  b e  done i s  not   obvious   and  i s  a n  area f o r  s t E d y .  
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Alternatively,  we  might  attempt  a  direct  formulation of the 
dogfight  problem  as a Markov game. Just  how  this  formulation 
should  proceed  is  not  immediately  apparent.  Nor  can  we  be  sure 
that  the  approach  is a viable  one.  These are problems  that  require 
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